Studdert-Kennedy Michael, Terrace Herbert
Haskins Laboratories and.
Columbia University.
J Lang Evol. 2017 Jul;2(2):114-125. doi: 10.1093/jole/lzx005. Epub 2017 Apr 7.
We review Berwick and Chomsky's a book premised on language as an instrument primarily of thought, only secondarily of communication. The authors conclude that a Universal Grammar can be reduced to three biologically isolated components, whose computational system for syntax was the result of a single mutation that occurred about 80,000 years ago. We question that argument because it ignores the origin of words, even though Berwick and Chomsky acknowledge that words evolved before grammar. It also fails to explain what evolutionary problem language uniquely solved (Wallace's question). To answer that question, we review recent discoveries about the ontogeny and phylogeny of words. Ontogenetically, two modes of nonverbal relation between infant and mother begin at or within 6 months of birth that are crucial antecedents of the infant's first words: intersubjectivity and joint attention. Intersubjectivity refers to rhythmic shared affect between infant and caretaker(s) that develop during the first 6 months. When the infant begins to crawl, they begin to attend jointly to environmental objects. Phylogenetically, Hrdy and Bickerton describe aspects of ' ecology and cognition that facilitated the evolution of words. Hrdy shows how cooperative breeding established trust between infant and caretakers, laying the groundwork for a community of mutual trust among adults. Bickerton shows how 'confrontational scavenging' led to displaced reference, whereby an individual communicated the nature of a dead animal and its location to members of the group that could not see it. Thus, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, the original function of language was primarily an instrument of communication. Rejecting Berwick and Chomsky's answer to Wallace's question that syntax afforded better planning and inference, we endorse Bickerton's view that language enabled speakers to refer to objects not immediately present. Thus arose context-free mental representations, unique to human language and thought.
我们回顾了贝里克和乔姆斯基的一本书,该书的前提是语言主要是思想的工具,其次才是交流的工具。作者得出结论,普遍语法可以简化为三个生物学上相互独立的成分,其句法计算系统是大约8万年前发生的一次单一突变的结果。我们对这一论点提出质疑,因为它忽略了词汇的起源,尽管贝里克和乔姆斯基承认词汇在语法之前就已演化出来。它也未能解释语言独特地解决了什么进化问题(华莱士的问题)。为了回答这个问题,我们回顾了关于词汇个体发生和系统发生的最新发现。从个体发生角度来看,婴儿与母亲之间两种非语言关系模式在出生时或出生后6个月内开始,它们是婴儿最初词汇的关键前身:主体间性和共同注意。主体间性指的是婴儿与照顾者之间在前6个月发展起来的有节奏的共享情感。当婴儿开始爬行时,他们开始共同关注环境中的物体。从系统发生角度来看,赫迪和比克顿描述了促进词汇进化的生态和认知方面。赫迪展示了合作繁殖如何在婴儿与照顾者之间建立信任,为成年人之间的相互信任社区奠定了基础。比克顿展示了“对抗性觅食”如何导致移位指称,即个体向看不见死动物的群体成员传达死动物的性质及其位置。因此,无论是从系统发生还是个体发生角度来看,语言的原始功能主要是交流的工具。我们拒绝接受贝里克和乔姆斯基对华莱士问题的回答,即句法提供了更好的规划和推理,我们赞同比克顿的观点,即语言使说话者能够指称并非即时出现的物体。于是就产生了人类语言和思维所特有的脱离语境的心理表征。