Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2020 Jan;118(1):22-56. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000173. Epub 2019 Sep 2.
We investigate the psychological bases underlying moral dilemma judgment with the help of multinomial processing tree modeling, and consider how determinants of dilemma judgment should best be conceptualized. We argue that, for conceptual as well as empirical reasons, norms and consequences should be considered as more intimately linked with one another than their systematic juxtaposition in dilemma research may suggest, and propose that norm-endorsement should be viewed through a consequentialist lens as well. Investigating this proposal, we introduce a variant of the CNI model of moral dilemma judgment, which focuses on the use of proscriptive norms only. In five experiments, we validate this proCNI model and assess the parameters' sensitivity to different types of consequences and personal involvement. Our findings suggest that the parameter representing "norms" is sensitive to consequences as well, such that norms do not guide moral judgment unless they are expected to produce tangible consequences. Thus, present research suggests that the split between norms and "consequences" (or "deontology" and "utilitarianism") as determinants of judgment is artificial. We suggest that, ultimately, viewing dilemma judgments through a consequentialist lens may be a useful approach for advancing theoretical development in the field of dilemma research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
我们借助多项处理树模型来研究道德困境判断的心理基础,并探讨困境判断的决定因素应如何得到最佳的概念化。我们认为,出于概念和经验的原因,规范和后果应该比困境研究中系统并列所表明的更为紧密地联系在一起,并且应该从后果主义的角度来看待规范的认可。为了研究这一建议,我们引入了一种道德困境判断的 CNI 模型变体,该模型仅侧重于使用禁止性规范。在五个实验中,我们验证了这个 proCNI 模型,并评估了参数对不同类型的后果和个人涉入的敏感性。我们的研究结果表明,代表“规范”的参数也对后果敏感,即除非规范预期会产生切实的后果,否则它们不会指导道德判断。因此,目前的研究表明,作为判断决定因素的“规范”和“后果”(或“义务论”和“功利主义”)之间的分裂是人为的。我们认为,最终,从后果主义的角度来看待困境判断可能是推进困境研究领域理论发展的一种有用方法。(PsycINFO 数据库记录(c)2019 APA,保留所有权利)。