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义务论者并不总是比功利主义者更值得信任:重新审视道德判断中可信度的推断。

Deontologists are not always trusted over utilitarians: revisiting inferences of trustworthiness from moral judgments.

机构信息

Department of Developmental, Personality, and Social Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Ghent, Belgium.

Department of Psychology, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Edvard Bulls veg 1, 7049, Trondheim, Norway.

出版信息

Sci Rep. 2023 Jan 30;13(1):1665. doi: 10.1038/s41598-023-27943-3.

Abstract

Recent research has looked at how people infer the moral character of others based on how they resolve sacrificial moral dilemmas. Previous studies provide consistent evidence for the prediction that those who endorse outcome-maximizing, utilitarian judgments are disfavored in social dilemmas and are seen as less trustworthy in comparison to those who support harm-rejecting deontological judgments. However, research investigating this topic has studied a limited set of sacrificial dilemmas and did not test to what extent these effects might be moderated by specific features of the situation described in the sacrificial dilemma (for instance, whether the dilemma involves mortal or non-mortal harm). In the current manuscript, we assessed the robustness of previous findings by exploring how trust inference of utilitarian and deontological decision makers is moderated by five different contextual factors (such as whether the sacrificial harm is accomplished by an action or inaction), as well as by participants' own moral preferences. While we find some evidence that trust perceptions of others are moderated by dilemma features, we find a much stronger effect of participants' own moral preference: deontologists favored other deontologists and utilitarians favored utilitarians. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 21 September 2022. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at: https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.21325953 .

摘要

最近的研究着眼于人们如何根据他人解决牺牲道德困境的方式来推断他人的道德品质。先前的研究为以下预测提供了一致的证据:那些赞成结果最大化、功利主义判断的人在社会困境中不受青睐,与支持拒绝伤害的道义论判断的人相比,他们被视为不可信。然而,研究这一主题的研究只研究了有限的一组牺牲困境,并且没有测试这些影响在多大程度上可能受到牺牲困境中描述的情况的具体特征的调节(例如,困境是否涉及致命或非致命伤害)。在当前的手稿中,我们通过探索功利主义和道义论决策者的信任推断如何受到五个不同情境因素(例如,牺牲伤害是通过行动还是不作为造成的)以及参与者自身道德偏好的调节,评估了先前发现的稳健性。虽然我们发现一些证据表明,对他人的信任感知受到困境特征的调节,但我们发现参与者自身道德偏好的影响要强得多:义务论者更喜欢其他义务论者,功利主义者更喜欢功利主义者。方案注册:本注册报告的第 1 阶段方案于 2022 年 9 月 21 日原则上被接受。该方案在被期刊接受后,可以在以下网址找到:https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.21325953

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/3873/9886848/94ebd1179e31/41598_2023_27943_Fig1_HTML.jpg

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