Department of Zoology and Biodiversity Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 6270 University Boulevard, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z4.
Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z2.
Proc Biol Sci. 2019 Sep 11;286(1910):20191425. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2019.1425. Epub 2019 Sep 4.
In an evolutionary context, trusted signals or cues provide individuals with the opportunity to manipulate them to their advantage by deceiving others. The deceived can then respond to the deception by either ignoring the signals or cues or evolving means of deception-detection. If the latter happens, it can result in an arms race between deception and detection. Here, we formally analyse these possibilities in the context of cue-mimicry in prey-predator interactions. We demonstrate that two extrinsic parameters control whether and for how long an arms race continues: the benefits of deception, and the cost of ignoring signals and cues and having an indiscriminate response. As long as the cost of new forms of deception is less than its benefits and the cost of new forms of detection is less than the cost of an indiscriminate response, an arms race results in the perpetual evolution of better forms of detection and deception. When novel forms of deception or detection become too costly to evolve, the population settles on a polymorphic equilibrium involving multiple strategies of deception and honesty, and multiple strategies of detection and trust.
在进化背景下，可信信号或线索为个体提供了通过欺骗他人来为自己谋取利益的机会。受骗者可以通过忽略信号或线索，或者通过进化出欺骗检测手段来对欺骗行为做出反应。如果后者发生，那么欺骗和检测之间就会发生军备竞赛。在这里，我们在猎物-捕食者相互作用的线索模拟背景下，正式分析这些可能性。我们证明，有两个外在参数控制着军备竞赛是否以及持续多长时间：欺骗的好处，以及忽略信号和线索并做出无差别反应的成本。只要新形式的欺骗的成本低于其好处，而新形式的检测的成本低于无差别反应的成本，那么军备竞赛就会导致更好形式的检测和欺骗的永久进化。当新形式的欺骗或检测变得过于昂贵而无法进化时，种群就会达到涉及多种欺骗和诚实策略以及多种检测和信任策略的多态平衡。
