School of Biological Sciences, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland, Australia.
PLoS One. 2011;6(10):e26017. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0026017. Epub 2011 Oct 5.
Deception remains a hotly debated topic in evolutionary and behavioural research. Our understanding of what impedes or facilitates the use and detection of deceptive signals in humans is still largely limited to studies of verbal deception under laboratory conditions. Recent theoretical models of non-human behaviour have suggested that the potential outcome for deceivers and the ability of receivers to discriminate signals can effectively maintain their honesty. In this paper, we empirically test these predictions in a real-world case of human deception, simulation in soccer. In support of theoretical predictions in signalling theory, we show that cost-free deceit by soccer players decreases as the potential outcome for the signaller becomes more costly. We further show that the ability of receivers (referees) to detect deceptive signals may limit the prevalence of deception by soccer players. Our study provides empirical support to recent theoretical models in signalling theory, and identifies conditions that may facilitate human deception and hinder its detection.
欺骗在进化和行为研究中仍然是一个备受争议的话题。我们对人类在使用和检测欺骗性信号方面的阻碍或促进因素的理解，仍然主要局限于实验室条件下对言语欺骗的研究。最近的非人类行为理论模型表明，欺骗者的潜在结果和接收者辨别信号的能力可以有效地维持他们的诚实。在本文中，我们在一个真实的人类欺骗案例——足球模拟中，对这些预测进行了实证检验。支持信号理论的理论预测，我们表明足球运动员的无成本欺骗行为随着信号发送者的潜在结果变得更加昂贵而减少。我们进一步表明，接收者（裁判）检测欺骗信号的能力可能会限制足球运动员欺骗行为的普遍程度。我们的研究为信号理论的最新理论模型提供了实证支持，并确定了可能促进人类欺骗行为和阻碍其检测的条件。
