Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany.
Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Nature. 2019 Nov;575(7782):345-349. doi: 10.1038/s41586-019-1741-y. Epub 2019 Nov 13.
The social sciences are going through what has been described as a 'reproducibility crisis'. Highly influential findings derived from accessible populations, such as laboratories and crowd-sourced worker platforms, are not always replicated. Less attention has been given to replicating findings that are derived from inaccessible populations, and recent high-profile replication attempts explicitly excluded such populations. Pioneering experimental work offered a rare glimpse into banker culture and found that bankers, in contrast to other professionals, are more dishonest when they think about their job. Given the importance of the banking sector, and before academics or policy-makers rely on these findings as an accurate diagnosis of banking culture, an exploration of their generalizability is warranted. Here we conduct the same incentivized task with bankers and non-bankers from five different populations across three continents (n = 1,282 participants). In our banker studies in the Middle East and Asia Pacific (n = 148 and n = 620, respectively), we observe some dishonesty, although-in contrast to the original study-this was not significantly increased among bankers primed to think about their work compared to bankers who were not primed. We also find that inducing non-banking professionals to think about their job does not have a significant effect on honesty. We explore sampling and methodological differences to explain the variation in findings in relation to bankers and identify two key points. First, the expectations of the general population regarding banker behaviour vary across jurisdictions, suggesting that banking culture in the jurisdiction of the original study may not be consistent worldwide. Second, having approached 27 financial institutions, many of which expressed concerns of adverse findings, we expect that only banks with a sound culture participated in our study. The latter introduces possible selection bias that may undermine the generalizability of any similar field study. More broadly, our study highlights the complexity of undertaking a high-fidelity replication of sensitive, highly publicized fieldwork with largely inaccessible populations resulting from institutional and geographical barriers. For policy-makers, this work suggests that caution should be exercised in generalizing the findings of the original study to other populations.
社会科学正经历着所谓的“可重复性危机”。从可接触人群(如实验室和众包工人平台)中得出的极具影响力的发现并不能总是被复制。对于从难以接触人群中得出的发现的复制,关注较少,最近一些备受瞩目的复制尝试明确排除了这些人群。开创性的实验工作罕见地揭示了银行家文化,并发现与其他专业人士相比,当银行家思考自己的工作时,他们更不诚实。鉴于银行业的重要性,在学术界或政策制定者将这些发现作为对银行文化的准确诊断之前,对其普遍性进行探索是有必要的。在这里,我们在三大洲的五个不同人群中对银行家和非银行家进行了相同的激励任务(n=1282 名参与者)。在我们在中东和亚太地区的银行家研究中(分别有 148 名和 620 名参与者),我们观察到了一些不诚实的行为,尽管与原始研究相比,在被提示思考工作的银行家中,这种行为并没有比没有被提示的银行家显著增加。我们还发现,诱导非银行专业人士思考自己的工作并不会对诚实产生显著影响。我们探讨了抽样和方法上的差异,以解释与银行家相关的研究结果的变化,并确定了两个关键点。首先,一般公众对银行家行为的期望因司法管辖区而异,这表明原始研究司法管辖区的银行文化可能在全球范围内并不一致。其次,我们已经接触了 27 家金融机构,其中许多机构对负面发现表示担忧,我们预计只有文化健全的银行才会参与我们的研究。后者可能引入了选择偏差,从而破坏任何类似实地研究的普遍性。更广泛地说,我们的研究强调了在存在制度和地理障碍导致难以接触到的大部分人群的情况下,对敏感、高度宣传的实地工作进行高保真复制的复杂性。对于政策制定者来说,这项工作表明,在将原始研究的发现推广到其他人群时应谨慎行事。