Turner R S
J Hist Behav Sci. 1977 Jan;13(1):48-58. doi: 10.1002/1520-6696(197701)13:1<48::aid-jhbs2300130106>3.0.co;2-l.
The philosophical convictions of Hermann von Helmholtz and the empiricist psychology he developed have been extensively discussed in historical literature. This literature has not usually emphasized the tacti assumptions about human physiology that underlaid these convictions nor the way in which Helmholtz's epistemology served as a methodological directive in his research. Helmholtz assumed nerve transmission between sense organs and the mind to be a passive process. Distortion in stimulus patterns occurs physically in the sense organs, which can therefore be treated through mechanical analogies. Stimuli become converted to the perceptions of consciousness through mental processes that are essentially analogous to conscious, inductive inference and that are therefore susceptible, in principle, to introspective investigation. This view of mental function reflected Helmholtz's intellectual debt to German idealism, especially to the philosophical views of J.G. Fichte.
赫尔曼·冯·亥姆霍兹的哲学信念以及他所发展的经验主义心理学在历史文献中已得到广泛讨论。这些文献通常既没有强调支撑这些信念的关于人类生理学的隐性假设,也没有强调亥姆霍兹的认识论在其研究中作为一种方法论指导的方式。亥姆霍兹假定感觉器官与心智之间的神经传递是一个被动过程。刺激模式的扭曲在感觉器官中以物理方式发生,因此可以通过机械类比来处理。刺激通过本质上类似于有意识的归纳推理且因此原则上易于进行内省研究的心理过程转化为意识的感知。这种心理功能观反映了亥姆霍兹在思想上对德国唯心主义的亏欠,尤其是对J.G.费希特哲学观点的亏欠。