Mohr Sibylle, Beard Rodney, Nisbet Alasdair J, Burgess Stewart T G, Reeve Richard, Denwood Matthew, Porphyre Thibaud, Zadoks Ruth N, Matthews Louise
Boyd Orr Centre for Population and Ecosystem Health, Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health and Comparative Medicine, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom.
Moredun Research Institute, Pentlands Science Park, Midlothian, United Kingdom.
Front Vet Sci. 2020 Feb 5;7:36. doi: 10.3389/fvets.2020.00036. eCollection 2020.
Game theory examines strategic decision-making in situations of conflict, cooperation, and coordination. It has become an established tool in economics, psychology and political science, and more recently has been applied to disease control. Used to examine vaccination uptake in human medicine, game theory shows that when vaccination is voluntary some individuals will choose to "free-ride" on the protection provided by others, resulting in insufficient coverage for control of a vaccine-preventable disease. Here, we use game theory to examine farmer uptake of a new diagnostic ELISA test for sheep scab-a highly infectious disease with an estimated cost exceeding £8M per year to the UK industry. The stochastic game models decisions made by neighboring farmers when deciding whether to adopt the newly available test, which can detect subclinical infestation. A key element of the stochastic game framework is that it allows multiple states. Depending on infestation status and test adoption decisions in the previous year, a farm may be at high, medium or low risk of infestation this year-a status which influences the decision the farmer makes and the farmer payoffs. Ultimately, each farmer's decision depends on the costs of using the diagnostic test vs. the benefits of enhanced disease control, which may only accrue in the longer term. The extent to which a farmer values short-term over long-term benefits reflects external factors such as inflation or individual characteristics such as patience. Our results show that when using realistic parameters and with a test cost around 50% more than the current clinical diagnosis, the test will be adopted in the high-risk state, but not in the low-risk state. For the medium risk state, test adoption will depend on whether the farmer takes a long-term or short-term view. We show that these outcomes are relatively robust to change in test costs and, moreover, that whilst the farmers adopting the test would not expect to see large gains in profitability, substantial reduction in sheep scab (and associated welfare implications) could be achieved in a cost-neutral way to the industry.
博弈论研究冲突、合作与协调情境中的战略决策。它已成为经济学、心理学和政治学中既定的工具,最近还被应用于疾病控制。博弈论用于研究人类医学中的疫苗接种情况,结果表明,当接种疫苗是自愿行为时,一些人会选择“搭便车”,利用他人提供的保护,从而导致疫苗可预防疾病的控制覆盖率不足。在此,我们运用博弈论来研究农民对一种用于检测羊疥癣的新型诊断性酶联免疫吸附测定(ELISA)检测方法的采用情况。羊疥癣是一种高度传染性疾病,据估计每年给英国养羊业造成的损失超过800万英镑。随机博弈模型模拟了相邻农场主在决定是否采用这种新可用检测方法时所做的决策,该检测方法能够检测亚临床感染。随机博弈框架的一个关键要素是它允许存在多种状态。根据上一年的感染状况和检测采用决策,一个农场今年可能处于高、中或低感染风险状态,这种状态会影响农场主的决策以及其收益。最终,每个农场主的决策取决于使用诊断检测的成本与加强疾病控制带来的益处的对比,而这种益处可能只会在长期内显现。农场主对短期利益和长期利益的重视程度反映了诸如通货膨胀等外部因素或诸如耐心等个人特征。我们的结果表明,当使用现实参数且检测成本比当前临床诊断高出约50%时,该检测方法将在高风险状态下被采用,但在低风险状态下不会被采用。对于中等风险状态,检测方法的采用将取决于农场主是采取长期还是短期视角。我们表明,这些结果对检测成本的变化相对稳健,此外,虽然采用该检测方法的农场主预计不会看到盈利能力有大幅提升,但可以以对行业成本中性的方式大幅减少羊疥癣(以及相关的福利影响)。