Boyd R, Richerson P J
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles 90024.
J Theor Biol. 1988 Jun 7;132(3):337-56. doi: 10.1016/s0022-5193(88)80219-4.
Recently, several authors have investigated the evolution of reciprocal altruism using the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. These models suggest that natural selection is likely to favor behavioral strategies leading to reciprocal cooperation when pairs of individuals interact repeatedly in potentially cooperative situations. Using the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma game, we consider whether reciprocal altruism is also likely to evolve when social interactions involve more individuals. We show that the conditions that allow the evolution of reciprocal cooperation become extremely restrictive as group size increases.
最近，几位作者使用重复囚徒困境博弈研究了互惠利他行为的演变。这些模型表明，当个体对在潜在合作情境中反复互动时，自然选择可能会青睐导致互惠合作的行为策略。使用重复n人囚徒困境博弈，我们考虑当社会互动涉及更多个体时，互惠利他行为是否也可能演变。我们表明，随着群体规模的增加，允许互惠合作演变的条件变得极其严格。
