Gensheimer K F
Maine Department of Human Services, Medical Epidemiology, State House #11, Key Plaza 286 Water Street, 04330 Augusta, ME, USA.
Int Congr Ser. 2004 Jun;1263:809-812. doi: 10.1016/j.ics.2004.01.021. Epub 2004 Jun 30.
The impact of the next pandemic influenza is likely to be far greater, by orders of magnitude, than most bioterrorism (BT) scenarios. A written pandemic emergency plan and establishment of emergency management teams are critical to mounting a coordinated and effective response to what will be a catastrophic event. Members of these teams should include public health, medical, emergency response and public safety officials, organized at each local, state and federal level. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks have substantially increased funding and support for bioterrorism planning in the United States. Thus, public health officials have an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen current systems' planning efforts by promoting dual use bioterrorism/pandemic influenza plans. Combining lessons learned from the 2001 terrorist incidents, recent preevent smallpox vaccine programs and the history of past influenza pandemics, more effective strategies can be developed. For example, enhanced influenza surveillance systems can provide data that will not only provide early identification of a novel influenza strain, but will provide more timely recognition of other outbreaks of infectious diseases, including public health threats that may initially present as an influenza-like illness (ILI). In recent years, we have witnessed emerging and reemerging infectious disease threats that have presented us with challenges similar to those posed by an influenza pandemic. Such events highlight the need for advance planning to ensure an optimal response to a health emergency that is certain to be unpredictable, complex, rapidly evolving and accompanied by considerable public alarm. While advance warning for a terrorist attack is unlikely, the warning already exists for a possible new influenza strain, as evidenced by the recent cases of H5N1 in Hong Kong and the rapid global spread of cases of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.
下一次大流行性流感造成的影响可能比大多数生物恐怖主义（BT）事件大得多，甚至是数量级上的差异。制定书面的大流行应急预案以及建立应急管理团队对于应对这一灾难性事件做出协调有效的反应至关重要。这些团队的成员应包括在地方、州和联邦各级组织起来的公共卫生、医疗、应急响应和公共安全官员。2001年9月11日的悲剧事件以及随后的炭疽袭击大幅增加了美国对生物恐怖主义规划的资金投入和支持。因此，公共卫生官员有前所未有的机会通过推动两用的生物恐怖主义/大流行性流感计划来加强当前系统的规划工作。结合从2001年恐怖事件、近期的天花疫苗接种事前计划以及过去流感大流行的历史中吸取的经验教训，可以制定出更有效的策略。例如，强化的流感监测系统不仅能提供数据以早期识别新型流感毒株，还能更及时地识别其他传染病疫情，包括那些最初可能表现为流感样疾病（ILI）的公共卫生威胁。近年来，我们目睹了新出现和再次出现的传染病威胁，它们给我们带来了与流感大流行类似的挑战。这些事件凸显了预先规划的必要性，以确保对一场肯定不可预测、复杂、迅速演变且伴随着公众高度恐慌的卫生紧急情况做出最佳反应。虽然不太可能对恐怖袭击发出预先警告，但对于可能出现的新型流感毒株，预警已然存在，香港近期出现的H5N1病例以及严重急性呼吸综合征病例在全球的迅速传播就是明证。
