School of Public Health, Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine, Shanghai, 200025, China.
Department of Military Health Service Management, College of Military Health Service Management, Second Military Medical University, Shanghai, 200433, China.
BMC Health Serv Res. 2020 Jun 3;20(1):490. doi: 10.1186/s12913-020-05309-z.
This study aims to establish a multi-agent system model to provide accurate suggestions for the policy proposal of controlling the unreasonable growth of medical expenses charged by public hospitals in China.
A multi-agent system model was employed in this study. Agents of this model were divided into patients, doctors, medical institutions, the government, and medical insurance agencies. The model was composed of two subsystems: the disease and medical-seeking subsystem, and the medical expenses subsystem. Policy intervention experiments were conducted on patients' medical-seeking preferences, doctors' public welfare behaviors, and the government's financial investment.
At present, medical expenses in China are unreasonable and keep increasing, and the proportion of medicine and physical examination expenses to total medical expenses for public hospitals is unreasonable. Intervention experiments suggested that expanding the promotion and application of the community first-visit system could rationalize patients' medical-seeking preferences, increasing doctors' incomes and reducing workload could significantly restrict doctors' over-prescription behaviors. Also, improving the government's financial investment could guide public hospitals to strengthen their commitment to public welfare responsibilities. These interventions could decrease the unreasonable growth of medical expenses of public hospitals. The combined intervention effects on suppliers, demanders, and the government were better than the effect of these agents independently.
The main reasons for the unreasonable increase in patient medical expenses at public hospitals could be attributed to patients' unreasonable medical-seeking preferences, doctors' weak public welfare incentives, and the government's inadequate financial investment. Policy-makers should consider proposals to restrict and guide the behaviors of suppliers, demanders, and the government, simultaneously. The government should consider the feasibility, response speed, and implementation cost of policies as well.
本研究旨在建立一个多代理系统模型,为中国公立医院医疗费用不合理增长的政策建议提供准确建议。
本研究采用多代理系统模型。该模型的代理分为患者、医生、医疗机构、政府和医疗保险机构。该模型由疾病和求医子系统以及医疗费用子系统组成。对患者求医偏好、医生公益行为和政府财政投入进行了政策干预实验。
目前,中国的医疗费用不合理且不断增加,公立医院的药品和体检费用占总医疗费用的比例不合理。干预实验表明,扩大社区首诊制度的推广应用可以使患者的求医偏好合理化,增加医生的收入和减少工作量可以显著限制医生的过度处方行为。此外,提高政府财政投入可以引导公立医院加强公益责任。这些干预措施可以降低公立医院医疗费用的不合理增长。对供应商、需求者和政府的综合干预效果优于这些代理机构的独立干预效果。
公立医院患者医疗费用不合理增长的主要原因是患者不合理的就医偏好、医生公益激励不足和政府财政投入不足。政策制定者应同时考虑限制和引导供应商、需求者和政府行为的建议。政府还应考虑政策的可行性、响应速度和实施成本。