School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Central South University, Changsha, Hunan, China.
Key Laboratory of Traffic Safety on Track, Ministry of Education, Changsha, Hunan, China.
Risk Anal. 2020 Oct;40(10):1944-1966. doi: 10.1111/risa.13528. Epub 2020 Jun 3.
China's railways were restructured in 2013. The number of regulatory practitioners has decreased significantly, making real-time regulation more difficult. Regulatory transfers from inside to outside the railway industry increases information risks. A more reasonable regulation mechanism is needed. The article considers introducing a public supervision mechanism into the railway transportation safety regulation system, which includes two regulators and one regulatee. As the government regulator, the State Railway Administration (SRA) regulates the safety of China Railway Corporation (CR) and encourages the public to act as supervisors to expose the CR's unsafe production information. To analyze the risks and effectiveness of the system, a multiplayer evolutionary game and system dynamics-based model for railway transportation safety regulation is established. The decision processes of players under different conditions are simulated. The results show that improving the public supervision ratio is conducive to improve the CR's safe production ratio. However, there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the system. Strategies and evolutionary processes have large fluctuations, which represent high risk. Excessive penalty and reward coefficients can aggravate the amplitude and frequency of fluctuations, causing uncertainty in regulation and making it more difficult to control the actual problems. A dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is proposed to control these fluctuations. The system finally achieves an ESS that results in the lowest regulation investment for the SRA, a safe production ratio for the CR of 95%, and a public supervision ratio of 95.2%. Introducing public supervision and dynamic reward and punishment mechanisms help to stabilize and improve the CR's safe production ratio and to decrease the SRA's regulatory investment.
中国的铁路系统于 2013 年进行了重组。监管从业者的数量大幅减少，使得实时监管更加困难。铁路行业内外的监管转移增加了信息风险。需要建立更合理的监管机制。本文考虑在铁路运输安全监管系统中引入公众监督机制，该机制包括两个监管者和一个被监管者。作为政府监管者，国家铁路局（SRA）监管中国铁路总公司（CR）的安全，并鼓励公众充当监管者，揭露 CR 的不安全生产信息。为了分析该系统的风险和有效性，建立了基于多人进化博弈和系统动力学的铁路运输安全监管模型。模拟了不同条件下玩家的决策过程。结果表明，提高公众监督比例有利于提高 CR 的安全生产比例。然而，系统中没有演化稳定策略（ESS）。策略和演化过程有较大波动，代表着高风险。过度的奖惩系数会加剧波动的幅度和频率，导致监管的不确定性，使实际问题的控制更加困难。提出了一种动态奖惩机制来控制这些波动。系统最终达到了 SRA 监管投资最低、CR 安全生产比例 95%、公众监督比例 95.2%的 ESS。引入公众监督和动态奖惩机制有助于稳定和提高 CR 的安全生产比例，并降低 SRA 的监管投资。
