Department of Logistics and E-Commerce, School of Economics and Management, Huaibei Normal University, Huaibei, China.
Front Public Health. 2023 Aug 22;11:1218301. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2023.1218301. eCollection 2023.
The performance of government functions is an important guarantee for the standardized operation of the elderly service market. The objective of this study is to explore the optimal path for the government to govern the elderly care service market.
The tripartite evolutionary game model is proposed in the paper, which composed of local governments, private elderly care institutions and the public. Furthermore, three mechanisms, i.e. dynamic penalty and static subsidy, static penalty and dynamic subsidy, dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy, are designed. Under these different mechanisms, the stability of each subject's strategy choice is analyzed by using system dynamics simulation.
The introduction of dynamic mechanisms can compensate for the inability of static mechanisms to bring the system to a steady state. The dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy mechanism allows the system to evolve to the desired point of stability. The self-discipline behavior of private elderly care institutions is positively correlated with penalties and reputation gains-losses, negatively correlated with subsidies, and not correlated with supervision rewards. Excessive subsidies will promote the collusion of private elderly institutions.
Only when the local government adopts the dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy mechanism will private elderly care institutions choose to operate in a fully self-disciplined manner. Reasonable adjustments of penalties, reputation gains-losses and subsidies can not only further optimize the dynamic penalty and dynamic subsidy mechanism, but also help to achieve diversified regulatory objectives of the government. This study would provide a reference for local governments seeking to develop effective regulatory policies for the elderly service market.
政府职能的发挥是规范养老服务市场运行的重要保障。本研究旨在探索政府治理养老服务市场的最优路径。
本文构建了由地方政府、民办养老机构和公众三方组成的三方演化博弈模型，并设计了动态惩罚与静态补贴、静态惩罚与动态补贴、动态惩罚与动态补贴三种机制，利用系统动力学仿真分析了不同机制下各主体策略选择的稳定性。
动态机制的引入可以弥补静态机制无法使系统达到稳定状态的不足。动态惩罚与动态补贴机制可以使系统演化到期望的稳定点。民办养老机构的自律行为与罚款和声誉损益正相关，与补贴负相关，与监管奖励不相关。过度补贴会促使民办养老机构之间产生合谋。
只有当地方政府采取动态惩罚与动态补贴机制时，民办养老机构才会选择完全自律的经营方式。合理调整罚款、声誉损益和补贴不仅可以进一步优化动态惩罚与动态补贴机制，还有助于实现政府的多元化监管目标。本研究为地方政府寻求制定有效的养老服务市场监管政策提供了参考。
