Gastelum Melina
Faculty of Philosophy and Literature (FFYL), National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Mexico City, Mexico.
Front Psychol. 2020 Jun 16;11:1188. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01188. eCollection 2020.
In this paper I seek to unify enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science by emphasizing the fact that both approaches view cognitive processes as being inherently temporally extended. My hypothesis is that characterizing the temporal scales in which perception of affordances occur, they can serve different purposes of explanation within the theories. Specifically, the paper brings together, on the one hand, Chemero's (2009) dynamicist understanding of affordances, which he called affordances 2.0, with, on the other hand, a distinction originally made by Varela (1999), and later taken up by Shaun Gallagher (2011, 2017b), between three different timescales for understanding cognition: the elementary, the integrative, and the narrative. Varela's three-fold distinction was originally intended as a way of identifying phenomenological events as being causally coupled to specific cellular events happening within the nervous system. The central claim of the present paper is that affordances, likewise, should be understood in terms of these three different timescales. I show that these temporal scales can be a useful toolkit for explaining the perception and learning of affordances and at the same time unifying enactivism and ecological psychology claiming that affordances serve a different explanatory role depending on which time scale you consider them at. If you are interested in explaining the embodied assemblies that form the always changing sensorimotor contingencies, then you see the elementary scale. If you're interested in explaining perception at the integrative scale, then affordances are solicitations that get actualized and bear an umwelt at that same scale. The perception of affordances as such is constituted by the integration of these first two scales, and the experience of it can be characterized by the husserlian structure of experience with its intrinsic temporality. Finally, if you are interested in explaining change in the animal-environment system over developmental time, that is, learning, then affordances are roughly what Chemero proposed and they operate at the narrative scale. But it is important to say that the three scales are always intertwined because learning and perception are ongoing processes that in many senses are impossible to separate. Finally, I discuss the importance of scales from the macro to micro levels for understanding behavior through affordances, considering them as synergies, where abilities and aspects of the environment are understood as constraints on the potential trajectories of such systems.
在本文中,我试图通过强调这样一个事实来统一认知科学中的生成方法和生态方法,即这两种方法都将认知过程视为本质上在时间上是延展的。我的假设是,通过刻画可供性感知发生的时间尺度,它们可以在理论中服务于不同的解释目的。具体而言,本文一方面将切梅罗(2009)对可供性的动力主义理解(他称之为可供性2.0),与另一方面瓦雷拉(1999)最初提出、后来被肖恩·加拉格尔(2011,2017b)采用的区分相结合,这种区分涉及理解认知的三种不同时间尺度:基本尺度、整合尺度和叙事尺度。瓦雷拉的三重区分最初旨在作为一种将现象学事件识别为与神经系统内发生的特定细胞事件因果耦合的方式。本文的核心主张是,同样地,可供性也应根据这三种不同的时间尺度来理解。我表明,这些时间尺度可以成为一个有用的工具包,用于解释可供性的感知和学习,同时统一生成主义和生态心理学,主张可供性根据你所考虑的时间尺度不同而发挥不同的解释作用。如果你有兴趣解释构成不断变化的感觉运动偶联的具身集合,那么你看到的是基本尺度。如果你有兴趣在整合尺度上解释感知,那么可供性就是被实现并在同一尺度上承载一个周围世界的诱因。可供性本身的感知由前两个尺度的整合构成,其体验可以用具有内在时间性的胡塞尔式体验结构来刻画。最后,如果你有兴趣解释动物 - 环境系统在发育时间内的变化,即学习,那么可供性大致就是切梅罗所提出的那样,它们在叙事尺度上起作用。但需要指出的是,这三个尺度总是相互交织的,因为学习和感知是持续的过程,在很多意义上是无法分离的。最后,我讨论了从宏观到微观层面的尺度对于通过可供性理解行为的重要性,将它们视为协同作用,其中能力和环境方面被理解为对这类系统潜在轨迹的限制。