Researcher affiliated with the Essex Autonomy Project, School of Philosophy and Art History, University of Essex, UK; Visiting Fellow at the Human Rights Centre, School of Law, University of Essex, UK; Assistant Professor at the Institute for Disability and Social Participation, Faculty of Special Needs Education, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary; and Impact Manager at Validity Foundation - Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, Hungary.
Health Hum Rights. 2020 Jun;22(1):279-292.
According to a longstanding definition of non-discrimination, differential treatment does not constitute discrimination if the purpose or effect of the differential treatment is to achieve a legitimate aim and if the differential treatment can be objectively and reasonably justified. This characterization reflects what Wouter Vandenhole has described as the "widely-used pragmatic definition of discrimination." In mental health policy, one important application of this definition pertains to the disputed question of whether coercive psychiatric interventions constitute discrimination on the basis of disability. In this paper, I consider whether the well-established pragmatic definition of discrimination remains valid in light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). I review evidence from the convention, from the general comment on equality and non-discrimination published by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and from the committee's adjudication of individual allegations of discrimination. I conclude that the CRPD and its treaty body send mixed signals in relation to the pragmatic definition: The convention itself is silent as regards the pragmatic definition, and while the committee has in some instances invoked it, it also seems to be pointing toward a new approach that goes beyond the pragmatic definition. I survey three possible alternatives to the pragmatic definition, tracing each to suggestions in the jurisprudence of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and illustrating how each can be applied in determining whether coercive psychiatry is discriminatory.
根据长期以来对非歧视的定义，如果差别待遇的目的或效果是实现合法目标，并且这种差别待遇可以客观和合理地证明是正当的，那么差别待遇不构成歧视。这种描述反映了沃特·范登霍勒（Wouter Vandenhole）所描述的“广泛使用的歧视的实用定义”。在精神卫生政策中，这一定义的一个重要应用涉及到有争议的问题，即强制性精神病干预是否构成基于残疾的歧视。在本文中，我考虑了在联合国《残疾人权利公约》（CRPD）的背景下，这种久经考验的歧视实用定义是否仍然有效。我审查了来自公约、残疾人权利委员会发布的关于平等和非歧视的一般性意见以及委员会对个人歧视指控的裁决中的证据。我得出的结论是，《残疾人权利公约》及其条约机构在实用主义定义方面发出了相互矛盾的信号：公约本身对实用主义定义保持沉默，虽然委员会在某些情况下援引了它，但它似乎也在指向一种超越实用主义定义的新方法。我调查了实用主义定义的三种可能替代方案，每种方案都追溯到残疾人权利委员会判例法中的建议，并说明了如何在确定强制性精神病学是否具有歧视性时应用每种方案。
