Überbacher Florian, Scherer Andreas Georg
Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich.
Adm Sci Q. 2020 Sep;65(3):565-605. doi: 10.1177/0001839219855033. Epub 2019 Jun 14.
Based on an in-depth, qualitative case study about a conflict between governmental authorities from the United States and Switzerland over the regulation of Swiss banks, we introduce as a novel triadic and indirect mechanism through which coercion leads to institutional change. Hostage-taking being a prototypical example, indirect compellence is typified by a coercive actor who takes a third party hostage to gain influence over a targeted actor. In our case, it meant that U.S. authorities (coercers) compelled Swiss policy makers (targets) to erode the famed Swiss banking secrecy rules by threatening the targets to otherwise enforce U.S. law extraterritorially against Swiss banks and bankers (hostages). Our constructivist and target-centered perspective explains this type of coercive pressure in detail, and it also suggests that targeted policy makers judge and respond to it contingent on their political ideologies. Our study contributes to research on power and influence in institutional environments and to research on global business regulation and transnational governance. Most generally, it also expands scholarly understanding of triadic relationships. In contrast to Simmelian perspectives' focus on triads in which the third party is in a powerful brokerage position and frequently benefits as a , our study suggests that the third party can also become a rather powerless who suffers rather than benefits from others' conflict.
基于一项关于美国政府当局与瑞士就瑞士银行监管问题发生冲突的深入定性案例研究，我们引入了一种新颖的三元间接机制，即胁迫如何导致制度变迁。人质劫持就是一个典型例子，间接强制的特点是一个胁迫行为者挟持第三方人质，以对目标行为者施加影响。在我们的案例中，这意味着美国当局（胁迫方）通过威胁瑞士政策制定者（目标方），否则将在美国境外对瑞士银行和银行家（人质）执行美国法律，从而迫使瑞士政策制定者削弱著名的瑞士银行保密规则。我们的建构主义和以目标为中心的视角详细解释了这种胁迫压力，并且还表明目标政策制定者会根据其政治意识形态来判断并应对这种压力。我们的研究有助于对制度环境中的权力与影响的研究，以及对全球商业监管和跨国治理的研究。最一般地说，它还扩展了学界对三元关系的理解。与齐美尔视角关注第三方处于强大中介地位并经常从中受益的三元组不同，我们的研究表明，第三方也可能成为相当无力的一方，因他人的冲突而受损而非受益。
