Bioethics. 2021 Jan;35(1):90-97. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12796. Epub 2020 Sep 9.
Douglas Diekema influentially argues that interference with parental decisions is not in fact guided by the child's best interests, but rather by a more permissive standard, which he calls the harm principle. This article first seeks to clarify this alternative position and defend it against certain existing criticisms, before offering a new criticism and alternative. This 'harm principle' has been criticized for (i) lack of adequate moral grounding, and (ii) being as indeterminate as the best interest standard that it seeks to replace. I argue that these are not serious problems. I take Diekema's negative point to be right-our actual standard for intervention is not literally the best interests of the child-but I disagree with his proposed replacement. First, Diekema's proposed harm threshold should be more carefully distinguished from Mill's harm principle. Second, there is no reason to assume that the standard for permissible intervention coincides with the threshold for harm (or serious harm). Thus, I propose that the best alternative to the best interests standard is not a harm principle, but rather a sufficiency threshold between adequate (or 'good enough') and inadequate (or 'substandard') parenting.
道格拉斯·迪基（Douglas Diekema）颇具影响力地认为，对父母决策的干预实际上并不是以孩子的最佳利益为指导，而是以更宽松的标准为指导，他称之为“伤害原则”。本文首先试图澄清这一替代立场，并对现有的某些批评进行辩护，然后提出新的批评和替代方案。这种“伤害原则”受到了以下批评：（i）缺乏充分的道德基础；（ii）与它试图取代的最佳利益标准一样不确定。我认为这些都不是严重的问题。我认为迪基的否定观点是正确的——我们干预的实际标准并不是字面意义上的孩子的最佳利益——但我不同意他提出的替代方案。首先，迪基提出的伤害门槛应该更仔细地区分于密尔的伤害原则。其次，没有理由假设允许干预的标准与伤害（或严重伤害）的门槛相吻合。因此，我提出，最佳利益标准的最佳替代方案不是伤害原则，而是介于足够（或“足够好”）和不足（或“低于标准”）育儿之间的充足性门槛。
