University of Roma Tre.
Sci Context. 2020 Mar;33(1):1-18. doi: 10.1017/S0269889720000095.
In this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond's thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond's speech "On the limits of natural science" (1872) in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the "hard problem of consciousness." Du Bois-Reymond's position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development.
本文对杜波依斯-雷蒙德关于意识的科学解释不可能这一论题进行了解读，探讨了该论题在当下的重要性。我重新审视了杜波依斯-雷蒙德 1872 年的演讲“论自然科学的界限”，并将其置于 19 世纪德国哲学和神经生理学的语境中，指出了与当代关于“意识的难题”的争论之间的联系和相似之处。杜波依斯-雷蒙德的立场基于一个认识论论点，其特点是形而上学的怀疑主义，这种怀疑主义源于当时德国哲学和自然科学中无益的思辨倾向。在最后的部分，我展示了当代研究如何受益于对这一立场及其出现背景的重新思考，从这一角度出发，可以很好地追溯意识研究中的开放性问题及其历史发展。
