London School of Economics and Political Science.
King's College London.
Milbank Q. 2020 Dec;98(4):1219-1256. doi: 10.1111/1468-0009.12476. Epub 2020 Oct 6.
UNLABELLED: Policy Points Regulatory agencies may have limited evidence on the clinical benefits and harms of new drugs when deciding whether new therapeutic agents are allowed to enter the market and under which conditions, including whether approval is granted under special regulatory pathways and obligations to address knowledge gaps through postmarketing studies are imposed. In a matched comparison of marketing applications for cancer drugs of uncertain therapeutic value reviewed by both the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), we found frequent discordance between the two agencies on regulatory outcomes and the use of special regulatory pathways. Both agencies often granted regular approval, even when the other agency judged there to be substantial uncertainty about drug benefits and risks that needed to be resolved through additional studies in the postmarketing period. Postmarketing studies imposed by regulators under special approval pathways to address remaining questions of efficacy and safety may not be suited to deliver timely, confirmatory evidence due to shortcomings in study design and delays, raising questions over the suitability of the FDA's Accelerated Approval and the EMA's Conditional Marketing Authorization as tools for allowing early market access for cancer drugs while maintaining rigorous regulatory standards. CONTEXT: Regulatory agencies are increasingly required to make market approval decisions for new drugs on the basis of limited clinical evidence, a situation commonly encountered in cancer. We aimed to investigate how regulators manage uncertainty in the benefit-risk profiles of new cancer drugs by comparing decisions for the world's two largest regulatory bodies-the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA)-over a 5-year period. METHODS: We systematically identified a set of cancer drug-indication pairs for which data on efficacy and safety was less complete than that required for regular approval at time of market entry from 2009 to 2013, as determined by the FDA's use of Accelerated Approval (AA) or the EMA's use of Conditional Marketing Authorization (CMA) pathways, and matched these across the two agencies. Using publicly available information, we compared regulatory pathways and outcomes, final approved indications, and postmarketing obligations imposed by the agencies. FINDINGS: We identified 21 cancer drug-indication pairs that received FDA AA, EMA CMA, or both. Although most applications relied on identical pivotal trials across the FDA and the EMA, regulatory pathways often differed; 57% of indications received either FDA AA or EMA CMA, and regular approval by the other agency. After approval, the EMA more often accepted single-arm studies to confirm clinical benefit compared to the FDA (75% vs. 29% of indications), and the FDA more commonly requested randomized controlled trials (85% vs. 50%). Forty-one percent of confirmatory trials after FDA AA were conducted in different populations than the approved indication, compared to 13% after EMA CMA. Both agencies relied primarily on surrogate measures of patient benefit for postmarketing obligations. After a median follow-up of 7.25 years, 40% of FDA and 61% of EMA postmarketing obligations after AA and CMA, respectively, were delayed. CONCLUSIONS: US and European regulators often deemed early and less complete evidence on benefit-risk profiles of cancer drugs sufficient to grant regular approval, raising questions over regulatory standards for the approval of new medicines. Even when imposing confirmatory studies in the postmarketing period through special approval pathways, meaningful evidence may not materialize due to shortcomings in study design and delays in conducting required studies with due diligence.
背景:监管机构越来越需要根据有限的临床证据来为新药做出市场批准决定,这种情况在癌症治疗中很常见。我们旨在通过比较全球最大的两个监管机构——美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)和欧洲药品管理局(EMA)——在 5 年期间的决策,研究监管机构如何管理新癌症药物的获益-风险概况中的不确定性。
方法:我们系统地确定了一组癌症药物-适应证对,这些药物的疗效和安全性数据在进入市场时不如常规批准所需的完整,这是由 FDA 使用加速批准(AA)或 EMA 使用有条件上市许可(CMA)途径决定的,并在这两个机构之间进行了匹配。使用公开可用的信息,我们比较了监管途径和结果、最终批准的适应证以及机构施加的上市后义务。
结果:我们确定了 21 个接受 FDA AA、EMA CMA 或两者的癌症药物-适应证对。尽管大多数应用都依赖于 FDA 和 EMA 之间完全相同的关键试验,但监管途径往往不同;57%的适应证获得了 FDA AA 或 EMA CMA 的批准,而另一个机构则给予了常规批准。批准后,与 FDA 相比,EMA 更常接受单臂研究来确认临床获益(75%对 29%的适应证),而 FDA 更常要求进行随机对照试验(85%对 50%的适应证)。在接受 FDA AA 后进行的 41%的确认性试验是在与批准适应证不同的人群中进行的,而在接受 EMA CMA 后进行的试验只有 13%。两个机构都主要依赖于患者获益的替代指标来履行上市后义务。在中位随访 7.25 年后,分别有 40%的 FDA 和 61%的 EMA 在 AA 和 CMA 后的上市后义务被推迟。
结论:美国和欧洲的监管机构经常认为,早期和不太完整的获益-风险概况证据足以授予常规批准,这引发了对新药批准监管标准的质疑。即使通过特殊批准途径在上市后期间施加确认性研究,由于研究设计的缺陷和在尽职调查下进行所需研究的延迟,也可能无法产生有意义的证据。
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