Mylopoulos Myrto, Shepherd Joshua
Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics
In this chapter we reflect on questions about the nature and sources of agentive phenomenology – that is, the set of those experience-types associated with exercises of agency, and paradigmatically with intentional actions. Our discussion begins with pioneering work in psychology and neuroscience that dates to the early 80s (section 1). As we will see, much of the current work on agentive phenomenology in both psychology and philosophy draws motivation from this work, and the questions it raises. After discussing empirical work relevant to agentive phenomenology, we turn to consideration of its nature. We cover questions about the scope of agentive phenomenology, about its relationship to other types of experiences (section 2.1), about the best way to characterize aspects of agentive phenomenology, and about the function of various types of agentive experience (section 2.2).
在本章中，我们思考关于能动现象学的本质和来源的问题——也就是说，与能动性的行使相关联的那组体验类型，典型地与意向性行动相关联。我们的讨论始于20世纪80年代早期心理学和神经科学领域的开创性工作（第1节）。正如我们将看到的，当前心理学和哲学中关于能动现象学的许多工作都从这项工作及其引发的问题中获得了动力。在讨论了与能动现象学相关的实证工作之后，我们转向对其本质的思考。我们涵盖了关于能动现象学范围的问题、关于它与其他类型体验的关系（第2.1节）、关于刻画能动现象学各方面的最佳方式的问题，以及关于各种类型能动体验的功能的问题（第2.2节）。
