De Sabbata Kevin
Athena Institute, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Front Psychiatry. 2020 Nov 9;11:571722. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.571722. eCollection 2020.
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has been at the center of considerable debate in the field of mental health. The discussion has caught up in particular after the publication of General Comment No. 1 in which the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities proposes a particularly radical interpretation of Article 12 of the Convention. Such a document has triggered skeptic and at times hostile reactions especially by psychiatrists, together with some positive comments. In this context, there is sometimes the tendency to focus only on the problematic aspects of the rights and support based model proposed by the CRPD and its Committee, forgetting that also "pre-CRPD" legislations on legal capacity present significant shortcomings. In this contribution I focus on the paradigmatic case of treatment decisions of people living with dementia with the aim to show how a number of provisions emerging from the CRPD and General Comment No. 1 can contribute to overcome the issues characterizing the traditional model of legal capacity and consent to treatment. First, I provide a brief overview of the provisions contained in the CRPD and General Comment No.1, summarizing the debate in this area. Then, I move to the case of treatment decisions of people living with dementia, analysing the main issues posed by the traditional model of capacity still characterizing European legislations. I will show how such problems and the solutions previously advanced by academics and practitioners resound in many ways with those identified by the CRPD and its Committee. In the second part, I analyse one by one the main provisions proposed by the CRPD and the Committee, studying how they can be applied in the area of treatment decisions of people living with dementia. In this context I point out the possible interpretations of the various provisions and their pros and cons, also referring to ongoing initiatives providing an insight on how such norms might work in practice.
《联合国残疾人权利公约》一直是心理健康领域大量辩论的核心。特别是在第1号一般性意见发布之后,讨论愈演愈烈。在该意见中,残疾人权利委员会对《公约》第12条提出了一种特别激进的解释。这样一份文件引发了怀疑甚至有时是敌对的反应,尤其是来自精神科医生的反应,不过也有一些积极的评论。在这种背景下,有时人们倾向于只关注残疾人权利委员会及其委员会提出的基于权利和支持的模式中存在问题的方面,而忘记了“《残疾人权利公约》之前”关于法律行为能力的立法也存在重大缺陷。在本论文中,我聚焦于痴呆症患者治疗决策的典型案例,旨在展示《残疾人权利公约》和第1号一般性意见中出现的一些规定如何有助于克服传统法律行为能力和治疗同意模式所具有的问题。首先,我简要概述《残疾人权利公约》和第1号一般性意见中的规定,总结该领域的辩论情况。然后,我转向痴呆症患者治疗决策的案例,分析欧洲立法中仍然存在的传统行为能力模式所带来的主要问题。我将展示这些问题以及学者和从业者先前提出的解决方案如何在许多方面与残疾人权利委员会及其委员会所确定的问题相呼应。在第二部分,我逐一分析残疾人权利委员会和委员会提出的主要规定,研究它们如何应用于痴呆症患者的治疗决策领域。在这方面,我指出各项规定可能的解释及其利弊,还提及正在进行的倡议,以深入了解这些规范在实践中可能如何发挥作用。