Frontotemporal Regulation of Subjective Value to Suppress Impulsivity in Intertemporal Choices.

Impulsive decisions arise from preferring smaller but sooner rewards compared with larger but later rewards. How neural activity and attention to choice alternatives contribute to reward decisions during temporal discounting is not clear. Here we probed (1) attention to and (2) neural representation of delay and reward information in humans (both sexes) engaged in choices. We studied behavioral and frequency-specific dynamics supporting impulsive decisions on a fine-grained temporal scale using eye tracking and MEG recordings. In one condition, participants had to decide for themselves but pretended to decide for their best friend in a second prosocial condition, which required perspective taking. Hence, conditions varied in the value for themselves versus that pretending to choose for another person. Stronger impulsivity was reliably found across three independent groups for prosocial decisions. Eye tracking revealed a systematic shift of attention from the delay to the reward information and differences in eye tracking between conditions predicted differences in discounting. High-frequency activity (175-250 Hz) distributed over right frontotemporal sensors correlated with delay and reward information in consecutive temporal intervals for high value decisions for oneself but not the friend. Collectively, the results imply that the high-frequency activity recorded over frontotemporal MEG sensors plays a critical role in choice option integration. Humans face decisions between sooner smaller rewards and larger later rewards daily. An objective benefit of losing weight over a longer time might be devalued in face of ice cream because they prefer currently available options because of insufficiently considering long-term alternatives. The degree of contribution of neural representation and attention to choice alternatives is not clear. We investigated correlates of such decisions in participants deciding for themselves or pretending to choose for a friend. Behaviorally participants discounted less in self-choices compared with the prosocial condition. Eye movement and MEG recordings revealed how participants represent choice options most evident for options with high subjective value. These results advance our understanding of neural mechanisms underlying decision-making in humans.