Wali Akshay, Kundu Shamik, Arnold Andrew J, Zhao Guangwei, Basu Kanad, Das Saptarshi
Department of Electrical Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, United States.
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080, United States.
ACS Nano. 2021 Feb 23;15(2):3453-3467. doi: 10.1021/acsnano.0c10651. Epub 2021 Jan 28.
Reverse engineering (RE) is one of the major security threats to the semiconductor industry due to the involvement of untrustworthy parties in an increasingly globalized chip manufacturing supply chain. RE efforts have already been successful in extracting device level functionalities from an integrated circuit (IC) with very limited resources. Camouflaging is an obfuscation method that can thwart such RE. Existing work on IC camouflaging primarily involves transformable interconnects and/or covert gates where variation in doping and dummy contacts hide the circuit structure or build cells that look alike but have different functionalities. Emerging solutions, such as polymorphic gates based on a giant spin Hall effect and Si nanowire field effect transistors (FETs), are also promising but add significant area overhead and are successfully decamouflaged by the satisfiability solver (SAT)-based RE techniques. Here, we harness the properties of two-dimensional (2D) transition-metal dichalcogenides (TMDs) including MoS, MoSe, MoTe, WS, and WSe and their optically transparent transition-metal oxides (TMOs) to demonstrate area efficient camouflaging solutions that are resilient to SAT attack and automatic test pattern generation attacks. We show that resistors with resistance values differing by 5 orders of magnitude, diodes with variable turn-on voltages and reverse saturation currents, and FETs with adjustable conduction type, threshold voltages, and switching characteristics can be optically camouflaged to look exactly similar by engineering TMO/TMD heterostructures, allowing hardware obfuscation of both digital and analog circuits. Since this 2D heterostructure devices family is intrinsically camouflaged, NAND/NOR/AND/OR gates in the circuit can be obfuscated with significantly less area overhead, allowing 100% logic obfuscation compared to only 5% for complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS)-based camouflaging. Finally, we demonstrate that the largest benchmarking circuit from ISCAS'85, comprised of more than 4000 logic gates when obfuscated with the CMOS-based technique, is successfully decamouflaged by SAT attack in <40 min; whereas, it renders to be invulnerable even in more than 10 h when camouflaged with 2D heterostructure devices, thereby corroborating our hypothesis of high resilience against RE. Our approach of connecting material properties to innovative devices to secure circuits can be considered as a one of a kind demonstration, highlighting the benefits of cross-layer optimization.
由于在日益全球化的芯片制造供应链中存在不可信方的参与,逆向工程(RE)是半导体行业面临的主要安全威胁之一。RE技术已经成功地利用非常有限的资源从集成电路(IC)中提取器件级功能。伪装是一种可以挫败此类RE的混淆方法。现有的IC伪装工作主要涉及可变换互连和/或隐蔽门,其中掺杂变化和虚设触点隐藏了电路结构,或者构建了外观相似但功能不同的单元。新兴的解决方案,如基于巨自旋霍尔效应的多晶型门和硅纳米线场效应晶体管(FET),也很有前景,但会增加显著的面积开销,并且会被基于可满足性求解器(SAT)的RE技术成功解伪装。在这里,我们利用二维(2D)过渡金属二卤化物(TMD)(包括MoS、MoSe、MoTe、WS和WSe)及其光学透明的过渡金属氧化物(TMO)的特性,来展示面积高效的伪装解决方案,这些方案能够抵御SAT攻击和自动测试图案生成攻击。我们表明,通过设计TMO/TMD异质结构,可以对电阻值相差5个数量级的电阻器、具有可变开启电压和反向饱和电流的二极管以及具有可调导电类型、阈值电压和开关特性的FET进行光学伪装,使其看起来完全相似,从而实现数字和模拟电路的硬件混淆。由于这个二维异质结构器件家族本质上是伪装好的,电路中的与非/或非/与/或门可以以显著更少的面积开销进行混淆,与基于互补金属氧化物半导体(CMOS)的伪装仅5%相比,可实现100%的逻辑混淆。最后,我们证明,ISCAS'85中最大的基准电路,在用基于CMOS的技术进行混淆时由4000多个逻辑门组成,在不到40分钟内就被SAT攻击成功解伪装;而当用二维异质结构器件进行伪装时,即使在超过10小时的时间里也仍然无法被破解,从而证实了我们关于对RE具有高抗性的假设。我们将材料特性与创新器件相连接以保障电路安全的方法可以被视为一种独一无二的演示,突出了跨层优化的好处。