Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol.
Perspect Psychol Sci. 2021 Nov;16(6):1360-1372. doi: 10.1177/1745691620959833. Epub 2021 Feb 12.
In psychiatry, mental dysfunction is typically framed in relation to models that seek to be continuous with physiology or evolutionary biology and that compare individual fitness to a broader functional norm. Proponents of the neurodiversity movement, however, challenge the pathologization of minority cognitive styles and argue that we should reframe neurocognitive diversity as a normal and healthy manifestation of biodiversity. Neurodiversity proponents have thus far drawn on social-relational models of disability to challenge the medical model of disability, but they have not developed an alternative functional analysis to replace conceptions of neurological dysfunction or impairment. Here I clarify and defend the neurodiversity perspective by drawing on ecological functional models that take relational contributions to collectives, and group functioning, into account alongside individual functionality. Using the example of autism as well as recent developments in the study of cognitive diversity, I apply these models to human mental functioning and argue that what I call the ecological model has greater utility for research and practice than the leading psychiatric functional analyses of mental functioning.
在精神病学中，精神功能障碍通常被框定为与试图与生理学或进化生物学保持一致的模型相关联的，并且将个体适应性与更广泛的功能规范进行比较。然而，神经多样性运动的支持者质疑将少数认知风格病理化的做法，并认为我们应该将神经认知多样性重新定义为生物多样性的正常和健康表现。神经多样性的支持者迄今为止已经利用社会关系模型来挑战残疾的医学模式，但他们没有开发出替代的功能分析来取代对神经功能障碍或损伤的概念。在这里，我通过借鉴考虑到集体的关系贡献以及群体功能的生态功能模型，来澄清和捍卫神经多样性的观点。我使用自闭症的例子以及认知多样性研究的最新进展，将这些模型应用于人类心理功能，并认为我所称的生态模型在研究和实践方面比主要的精神功能的精神病学功能分析更具实用性。
