Liu Mengqi, Zhao Yueli, Huang Rui, Perera Sandun
Business School, Hunan University, Changsha, 410082 Hunan China.
College of Business, The University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557 USA.
Ann Oper Res. 2021 Mar 8:1-34. doi: 10.1007/s10479-021-04021-3.
We study a two-echelon supply chain with two homogeneous manufacturers and one common retailer who has full knowledge about his own value-added service cost structure that is unknown to the manufacturers. The retailer may choose to disclose his cost information to the manufacturers. Using a three-stage game-theoretic model, we derive optimal pricing strategies for each participant, and optimal information sharing strategies, and the optimal level of the value-added services for the retailer. Our study also reveals when the manufacturers should accept the disclosed information by the retailer. It is shown that information sharing does not always create a win-win situation among the partners in the supply chain. When the value-added service cost efficiency is low, the retailer is willing to share complete information with the manufacturers; however, information sharing harms the manufacturers' profits if they accept the shared information. In contrast, when the value-added service cost efficiency is high, the common retailer has no incentive to share information with the manufacturers and the unique equilibrium is no information sharing. Finally, we utilize a revenue-sharing contract to achieve supply chain coordination and induce information sharing under asymmetric information.
我们研究了一个两级供应链，其中有两个同质制造商和一个共同零售商，该零售商完全了解自己的增值服务成本结构，但制造商对此并不知晓。零售商可以选择向制造商披露其成本信息。通过一个三阶段博弈模型，我们推导出了每个参与者的最优定价策略、最优信息共享策略以及零售商的最优增值服务水平。我们的研究还揭示了制造商何时应该接受零售商披露的信息。结果表明，信息共享并不总是能在供应链合作伙伴之间创造双赢局面。当增值服务成本效率较低时，零售商愿意与制造商共享完整信息；然而，如果制造商接受共享信息，信息共享会损害他们的利润。相比之下，当增值服务成本效率较高时，共同零售商没有动机与制造商共享信息，唯一的均衡是不共享信息。最后，我们利用收益共享契约来实现供应链协调，并在信息不对称的情况下诱导信息共享。
