Hershow Rebecca B, Segaloff Hannah E, Shockey Abigail C, Florek Kelsey R, Murphy Sabrina K, DuBose Weston, Schaeffer Tammy L, Powell Mph Jo Anna, Gayle Krystal, Lambert Lauren, Schwitters Amee, Clarke Kristie E N, Westergaard Ryan
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep. 2021 Apr 2;70(13):478-482. doi: 10.15585/mmwr.mm7013a4.
SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, can spread rapidly in prisons and can be introduced by staff members and newly transferred incarcerated persons (1,2). On September 28, 2020, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) contacted CDC to report a COVID-19 outbreak in a state prison (prison A). During October 6-20, a CDC team investigated the outbreak, which began with 12 cases detected from specimens collected during August 17-24 from incarcerated persons housed within the same unit, 10 of whom were transferred together on August 13 and under quarantine following prison intake procedures (intake quarantine). Potentially exposed persons within the unit began a 14-day group quarantine on August 25. However, quarantine was not restarted after quarantined persons were potentially exposed to incarcerated persons with COVID-19 who were moved to the unit. During the subsequent 8 weeks (August 14-October 22), 869 (79.4%) of 1,095 incarcerated persons and 69 (22.6%) of 305 staff members at prison A received positive test results for SARS-CoV-2. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) of specimens from 172 cases among incarcerated persons showed that all clustered in the same lineage; this finding, along with others, demonstrated that facility spread originated with the transferred cohort. To effectively implement a cohorted quarantine, which is a harm reduction strategy for correctional settings with limited space, CDC's interim guidance recommendation is to serial test cohorts, restarting the 14-day quarantine period when a new case is identified (3). Implementing more effective intake quarantine procedures and available mitigation measures, including vaccination, among incarcerated persons is important to controlling transmission in prisons. Understanding and addressing the challenges faced by correctional facilities to implement medical isolation and quarantine can help reduce and prevent outbreaks.
导致新冠肺炎的严重急性呼吸综合征冠状病毒2(SARS-CoV-2)可在监狱中迅速传播,且可由工作人员和新转入的被监禁人员引入(1,2)。2020年9月28日,威斯康星州卫生服务部(DHS)联系美国疾病控制与预防中心(CDC),报告了一所州立监狱(监狱A)发生的新冠肺炎疫情。在10月6日至20日期间,一个CDC团队对此次疫情进行了调查,疫情始于8月17日至24日从同一监区被监禁人员采集的标本中检测出的12例病例,其中10人于8月13日一起被转移,并按照监狱接收程序进行隔离(接收隔离)。该监区内的潜在暴露人员于8月25日开始为期14天的集体隔离。然而,在被隔离人员有可能接触到被转移至该监区的新冠肺炎确诊被监禁人员后,隔离并未重新开始。在随后的8周内(8月14日至10月22日),监狱A的1095名被监禁人员中有869人(79.4%)以及305名工作人员中有69人(22.6%)的严重急性呼吸综合征冠状病毒2检测结果呈阳性。对172例被监禁人员的标本进行全基因组测序(WGS)显示,所有病例都聚集在同一谱系中;这一发现以及其他发现表明,疫情在该设施内的传播源于被转移的那批人员。为有效实施群组隔离,这是一种针对空间有限的惩教机构的减少伤害策略,CDC的临时指南建议对群组进行连续检测,在发现新病例时重新开始为期14天的隔离期(3)。在被监禁人员中实施更有效的接收隔离程序以及包括疫苗接种在内的可用缓解措施,对于控制监狱内的传播至关重要。了解并应对惩教机构在实施医学隔离和检疫方面面临的挑战,有助于减少和预防疫情爆发。