Takeuchi Maria R H, Hasegawa Tatsuya, Hardie Susie M L, McKinley Linda E, Marquez Gian Powell B, Ishihara Keiichi N
Graduate School of Energy Science, Kyoto University, Yoshidahonmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan.
Department of Aerospace Engineering, Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya 464-8603, Japan.
Heliyon. 2021 Mar 29;7(3):e06588. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e06588. eCollection 2021 Mar.
The Japanese government decided to implement environmental remediation after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (termed "1F" in Japan) accident on 11th March 2011. As the initial additional annual dose target was set to be 1 mSv or less as a long-term goal, we examined the decision-making process undertaken by the then leaders, particularly the Minister of the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) who was responsible for the final decision. We found that technically based assessment of dose targets, health effects and risk-based approaches justified by scientific experts were not communicated to the then Minister and officials of the MOE before the remediation strategy was decided. We defined how such a decision was made based on leadership theories such as the Role Theory and the Cognitive Resources Theory. Academic leaders could have examined the Windscale accident (UK, 1957), which could be considered as the closest analogue (at least in terms of radionuclide releases) to the 1F accident. Environmental remediation could have been planned and implemented more effectively whilst still maintaining the highest possible safety standards and balancing the environmental and economic burden. Appropriate scientific input should have been provided by academic leaders to political and administrative leaders and such scientific justification should have been disclosed to the general public (especially the residents of Fukushima Prefecture) so that the general public could have developed greater trust in their leaders and have more readily accepted the decisions made.
2011年3月11日福岛第一核电站事故（日本称为“1F”）发生后，日本政府决定实施环境修复。由于最初设定的长期额外年剂量目标为1毫希沃特或更低，我们研究了当时领导人，特别是负责最终决策的环境省大臣所采取的决策过程。我们发现，在决定修复策略之前，科学专家基于技术的剂量目标评估、健康影响和基于风险的方法并未传达给当时的环境省大臣和官员。我们根据角色理论和认知资源理论等领导理论来界定这样的决策是如何做出的。学术领导人本可以研究温斯凯尔事故（英国，1957年），该事故可被视为与1F事故最相似的案例（至少在放射性核素释放方面）。本可以在保持尽可能高的安全标准并平衡环境和经济负担的同时，更有效地规划和实施环境修复。学术领导人本应向政治和行政领导人提供适当的科学意见，并且应向公众（特别是福岛县居民）披露这种科学依据，以便公众能够对其领导人产生更大的信任，并更愿意接受所做出的决策。
