Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney, 2109 NSW, Australia.
Corpus Christi College, Oxford OX1 4JF, UK.
Cogn Neuropsychiatry. 2021 Jul;26(4):213-230. doi: 10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016. Epub 2021 Apr 20.
In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. , , 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce.
In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief.
We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence.
In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.
在妄想信念的二因素理论的叙述中，该理论的第二个因素仅以最笼统的术语提及，即假设评估过程中的失败，而没有试图详细描述这些过程。Coltheart 和 Davies（[2021]。意外观察如何导致新信念：皮尔士的进路。 ， ，103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037）尝试了这样的描述，基于 Charles Sanders Peirce 提出的溯因推理概念，提出了一个详细的八步模型，说明意外观察如何导致新信念。
在本文中，我们将该模型应用于各种形式的妄想信念的解释。
我们提供的证据表明，在妄想症的情况下，我们模型的第七步存在特定的失败：即根据相关证据考虑（妄想）假设预测的步骤。
在妄想信念的二因素理论中，第二个因素包括面对证伪证据时无法拒绝假设。
