The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
J Med Philos. 2021 Jun 9;46(3):330-349. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhab004.
Although the principle of respect for personal autonomy has been the subject of debate for almost 40 years, the conversation has often suffered from lack of clarity regarding the philosophical traditions underlying this principle. In this article, I trace a genealogy of autonomy, first contrasting Kant's autonomy as moral obligation and Mill's teleological political liberty. I then show development from Mill's concept to Beauchamp and Childress' principle and to Julian Savulescu's non-teleological autonomy sketch. I argue that, although the reach for a new principle to guide choices in physician-patient relationships can rightfully be seen as important, the notion that is now called autonomy within bioethics has corollaries that undermine critical aspects of medical care. As such, there is need for a richer account of the interplay between the free choice of patients and the informed recommendations of doctors.
尽管尊重个人自主权的原则已经成为近 40 年来争论的主题,但由于缺乏对该原则所依据的哲学传统的清晰认识,这场对话往往收效甚微。在本文中,我追溯了自主性的渊源,首先对比了康德的自主性作为道德义务和密尔的目的论政治自由。然后,我展示了从密尔的概念到比彻姆和邱吉尔的原则以及朱利安·萨维勒斯库的非目的论自主性草图的发展。我认为,尽管为指导医患关系中的选择而寻求新的原则可以被视为重要的,但是现在在生物伦理学中被称为自主性的概念有一些必然结果,这些结果破坏了医疗保健的关键方面。因此,需要更深入地了解患者的自由选择和医生的知情建议之间的相互作用。