Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, 417 Chapel Drive, Durham, NC, 27708, USA.
Department of Philosophy, Neuroscience Program, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL, USA.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2021 Oct;28(5):1735-1741. doi: 10.3758/s13423-021-01935-8. Epub 2021 May 4.
Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer general moral principles for people to follow. These moral principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid, offering reliable guides for moral judgment and decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found consistent evidence that agreement with general moral principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with those very principles-relative to participants who recalled events in which other people violated the principles. This shift in agreement was explained, in part, by people's willingness to excuse their own moral transgressions, but not the transgressions of others. These results have important implications for understanding the roles memory and personal identity in moral judgment. People's commitment to moral principles may be maintained when they recall others' past violations, but their commitment may wane when they recall their own violations.
规范伦理理论和宗教传统为人们提供了遵循的一般道德原则。这些道德原则通常是固定的和僵化的，为道德判断和决策提供可靠的指导。在两项预先注册的研究中，我们发现一致的证据表明，对一般道德原则的认同会根据最近记忆中访问的事件而变化。在回忆起自己违反道德原则的行为后，参与者对这些原则的认同程度相对较低，而参与者回忆起其他人违反这些原则的行为。这种认同的转变部分可以解释为人们愿意原谅自己的道德过失，但不会原谅他人的过失。这些结果对理解记忆和个人身份在道德判断中的作用具有重要意义。当人们回忆起他人过去的违规行为时，他们对道德原则的承诺可能会得到维持，但当他们回忆起自己的违规行为时，这种承诺可能会减弱。
