Tappin Ben M, McKay Ryan T
ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and Its Disorders, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom.
Soc Psychol Personal Sci. 2017 Aug;8(6):623-631. doi: 10.1177/1948550616673878. Epub 2016 Oct 19.
Most people strongly believe they are just, virtuous, and moral; yet regard the average person as distinctly less so. This invites accusations of irrationality in moral judgment and perception-but direct evidence of irrationality is absent. Here, we quantify this irrationality and compare it against the irrationality in other domains of positive self-evaluation. Participants ( = 270) judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of "positive illusion," but the underlying function remains unknown.
大多数人坚信自己是公正、有德行且道德高尚的;然而却认为普通人明显不如自己。这引发了对道德判断和认知中不合理性的指责——但却缺乏不合理性的直接证据。在此,我们对这种不合理性进行量化,并将其与积极自我评价的其他领域中的不合理性进行比较。参与者((n = 270))就反映社会认知核心维度的特质(道德、能动性和社交性)对自己和普通人进行了评判。采用新方法后,我们发现几乎所有人都不合理地夸大了自己的道德品质,而且这种不合理性的绝对和相对程度都大于积极自我评价的其他领域。与普遍存在的过度积极自我信念理论不一致的是,不合理的道德优越感与自尊无关。综合来看,这些发现表明道德优越感是一种独特且强烈、普遍存在的“积极错觉”形式,但其潜在功能仍不明确。