School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110169, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2021 Oct;28(39):54852-54862. doi: 10.1007/s11356-021-13104-4. Epub 2021 May 21.
Considering the bargaining power of enterprises, this paper distinguishes between "Offering Bribes Voluntarily" (OBV) and "Offering Bribes under Pressure from Environmental Inspectors" (NOBV). An evolutionary game model between environmental inspectors and enterprises is constructed to study the corruption of environmental inspectors in the process of environmental tax collection under the system of upward accountability. At the same time, numerical simulations are carried out using China's pollution discharge data and pollution discharge fee collection standards in 2017. The results show that when enterprises have different bargaining powers, there are differences in the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the process of environmental tax collection. Enterprises with weak bargaining power may adopt "OBV" strategy. Under the system of upward accountability, it is difficult for the public to form adequate supervision over polluting enterprises and environmental inspectors. Only with the power of the upper-level government can the public's supervisory role be brought into play. High audit costs and environmental tax rates may be objective incentives for environmental inspectors' corruption and enterprises' bribery.
考虑到企业的讨价还价能力，本文将“自愿行贿”（OBV）和“迫于环境监察员压力行贿”（NOBV）区分开来。构建了环境监察员与企业之间的演化博弈模型，以研究在问责制制度下，在环境税征收过程中环境监察员的腐败问题。同时，利用中国 2017 年的污染排放数据和污染排放费征收标准进行了数值模拟。结果表明，当企业具有不同的讨价还价能力时，在环境税征收过程中，企业的演化稳定策略（ESS）存在差异。在问责制制度下，公众很难对污染企业和环境监察员形成充分的监督，只有借助上级政府的权力，才能发挥公众的监督作用。高昂的审计成本和环境税率可能是环境监察员腐败和企业行贿的客观诱因。
