He Lidao, Quan Shitao
School of Public Finance and Management, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan Province, China.
School of Economics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan Province, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Sep 25;10(19):e38459. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e38459. eCollection 2024 Oct 15.
The ability to form a collaborative governance alliance is crucial to the in-depth promotion of pollution prevention and control. Starting from the perspective of regional development imbalance, this paper uses an evolutionary game model to explore how initial strategy choice, game order, financial and environmental protection expenditure efficiency, and total factor productivity affect the formation and stabilization of the cooperative alliance of "joint prevention and control, cross-regional governance". The study shows that strategic interactions between governments can lead to "cooperative" or "collusive" outcomes and that game order and initial strategy play a key role in the formation of these outcomes. In addition, changes in parameters such as fiscal and environmental expenditure efficiency and total factor productivity can greatly affect the evolutionary path and the speed of convergence. Particularly in less developed regions, fiscal and environmental spending efficiency plays a crucial role in promoting government "cooperation", which tends to be weakened by increases in total factor productivity. In contrast, economically developed regions tend to favor "cooperation" and "investment" strategies. This study provides valuable policy recommendations for enhancing interregional cooperation in environmental governance.
形成协同治理联盟的能力对于深入推进污染防治至关重要。本文从区域发展不平衡的角度出发，运用演化博弈模型，探讨初始策略选择、博弈顺序、财政与环境保护支出效率以及全要素生产率如何影响“联防联控、跨区域治理”合作联盟的形成与稳定。研究表明，政府间的战略互动会导致“合作”或“勾结”结果，且博弈顺序和初始策略在这些结果的形成中起关键作用。此外，财政与环境支出效率、全要素生产率等参数的变化会极大地影响演化路径和收敛速度。特别是在欠发达地区，财政与环境支出效率在促进政府“合作”方面发挥着关键作用，而全要素生产率的提高往往会削弱这种作用。相比之下，经济发达地区倾向于采取“合作”和“投资”策略。本研究为加强区域间环境治理合作提供了有价值的政策建议。
