Svenaeus Fredrik
Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
Topoi (Dordr). 2022;41(2):373-382. doi: 10.1007/s11245-021-09747-0. Epub 2021 May 19.
In this paper I explore health and illness through the lens of enactivism, which is understood and developed as a bodily-based worldly-engaged phenomenology. Various health theories - biomedical, ability-based, biopsychosocial - are introduced and scrutinized from the point of view of enactivism and phenomenology. Health is ultimately argued to consist in a central world-disclosing aspect of what is called existential feelings, experienced by way of transparency and ease in carrying out important life projects. Health, in such a phenomenologically enacted understanding, is an important and in many cases necessary part of leading a good life. Illness, on the other hand, by such a phenomenological view, consist in finding oneself at mercy of unhomelike existential feelings, such as bodily pains, nausea, extreme unmotivated tiredness, depression, chronic anxiety and delusion, which make it harder and, in some cases, impossible to flourish. In illness suffering the lived body hurts, resists, or, in other ways, alienates the activities of the ill person.
在本文中，我通过具身认知论的视角来探讨健康与疾病，具身认知论被理解并发展为一种基于身体的、与世界互动的现象学。从具身认知论和现象学的角度介绍并审视了各种健康理论——生物医学理论、基于能力的理论、生物心理社会理论。最终认为，健康在于所谓生存感受的一个核心的、揭示世界的方面，这种感受通过在开展重要生活计划时的透明感和轻松感来体验。在这种现象学阐释的理解中，健康是过上美好生活的一个重要且在许多情况下必要的部分。另一方面，从这种现象学观点来看，疾病在于发现自己受非本真的生存感受摆布，如身体疼痛、恶心、极度无动力的疲惫、抑郁、慢性焦虑和妄想，这些感受使蓬勃发展变得更加困难，在某些情况下甚至变得不可能。在疾病折磨中，活生生的身体会疼痛、抗拒或以其他方式使病人的活动变得疏离。
