Najenson Jonathan, Fresco Nir
Department of Philosophy, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel.
Department of Brain & Cognitive Sciences and Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beersheba, Israel.
Front Psychol. 2021 Sep 13;12:634968. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.634968. eCollection 2021.
Knowledge-how is the kind of knowledge implicated in skill employment and acquisition. Intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is a special type of propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is not propositional. We argue that both views face two open challenges. The first challenge pertains to the relationship between informational states and motor variability. The second pertains to the epistemic function of practice that leads to skill (and knowledge-how). The aim of this paper is to suggest a general conceptual framework based on functional information with both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist features. Our proposal, we argue, avoids the above challenges, and can further the debate on knowledge-how and skill.
技能知识是与技能运用和习得相关的那种知识。理智主义者声称技能知识是命题知识的一种特殊类型。反理智主义者则声称技能知识不是命题性的。我们认为这两种观点都面临两个尚未解决的挑战。第一个挑战涉及信息状态与运动变异性之间的关系。第二个挑战涉及导致技能（以及技能知识）的实践的认知功能。本文的目的是提出一个基于功能信息的一般概念框架，它兼具理智主义和反理智主义的特征。我们认为，我们的提议避免了上述挑战，并能推动关于技能知识和技能的争论。
