Lv Aofei, Luo Ting, Duckett Jane
University of Glasgow.
Manchester Metropolitan University.
J Health Polit Policy Law. 2022 Jun 1;47(3):411-427. doi: 10.1215/03616878-9626908.
Researchers have begun to examine whether centralized or decentralized (or federal) political systems have better responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this article, we probe beneath the surface of China's political system to examine the balance between centralized and decentralized authority in China's handling of the pandemic. We focus not on the much-studied later response phase but on the detection and early response phases. We show that after the SARS epidemic of 2003, China sought to improve its systems by both centralizing early infectious disease reporting and decentralizing authority to respond to local health emergencies. But these adjustments in the central-local balance of authority after SARS did not change "normal times" authority relations and incentive structures in the political system-indeed they strengthened local authority. As a result, local leaders had both the enhanced authority and the incentives to prioritize tasks that determine their political advancement at the cost of containing the spread of COVID-19. China's efforts to balance central and local authority show just how difficult it is to get that balance right, especially in the early phases of a pandemic.
研究人员已开始探讨中央集权或分权(或联邦制)政治体制对新冠疫情的应对是否更为有效。在本文中,我们深入探究中国政治体制的表象之下,审视中国在应对疫情过程中中央与地方权力的平衡。我们关注的并非备受研究的后期应对阶段,而是检测与早期应对阶段。我们表明,2003年非典疫情过后,中国试图通过集中早期传染病报告以及下放应对地方卫生紧急情况的权力来完善其体系。但非典过后中央与地方权力平衡的这些调整并未改变政治体制中“正常时期”的权力关系和激励结构——事实上,它们强化了地方权力。结果,地方领导人既有了增强的权力,也有了将决定其政治晋升的任务置于优先地位的动机,而不惜以遏制新冠疫情传播为代价。中国平衡中央与地方权力的努力表明,要实现这种平衡是多么困难,尤其是在疫情初期。