Embodied Cognitive Science Unit (ECSU), Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST), Okinawa, Japan.
Social Sciences and Humanities Division, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Cuajimalpa (UAM-C), Mexico, Mexico.
Hist Philos Life Sci. 2021 Dec 2;43(4):127. doi: 10.1007/s40656-021-00479-3.
The autopoietic enactive account of cognition explains the emergence of normativity in nature as the norm of self-maintenance of life. The autonomous nature of living agents implies that they can differentiate events and regulate their responses in terms of what is better or worse to maintain their own precarious identity. Thus, normative behavior emerges from living organisms. Under this basic understanding of normativity as self-maintenance, autopoietic enactivism defends a continuity between biological, cognitive, and social norms. The self-maintenance of an agent's sensorimotor identity establishes the cognitive norms that regulate its behavior, and the self-maintenance of its social identity determines the social norms. However, there is no clear explanation of how individuals, who by their very constitution are primarily moved to interact with the world under the norm of self-maintenance, could interact with the world driven by non-individual norms. Furthermore, understanding all normativity as self-maintenance makes it unclear how agents establish genuine social interactions and acquire habits that have no implication for their constitution as individuals. So, to face these challenges, I propose an alternative notion of normativity grounded on a Wittgensteinian, action-oriented, and pragmatic conception of meaning that distinguishes between an agent with a normative point of view and external normative criteria. I defend that a normative phenomenon is an interaction that is established by an individual point of view as defined by autopoietic enactivism and that is part of a self-maintaining system. The latter establishes the external normative criteria to evaluate the interaction, and it may or may not coincide with the identity of the interacting agent. Separating external normative criteria from the self-constitution of the interactant agent not only solves the challenge but potentially explains the situated and relational character of agency.
自主能动性的自组织认知解释了规范性在自然界中的出现,即生命自我维持的规范。生命主体的自主性意味着它们可以区分事件,并根据维持自身脆弱身份更好或更差的情况来调节自己的反应。因此,规范行为源自生物体。在这种对规范性的基本理解下,即自我维持,自主能动性为生物、认知和社会规范之间的连续性辩护。主体的感觉运动身份的自我维持建立了调节其行为的认知规范,而其社会身份的自我维持决定了社会规范。然而,对于那些根据其自身构成主要受自我维持规范驱使与世界互动的个体,如何能够受非个体规范的驱动与世界互动,并没有明确的解释。此外,将所有规范性都理解为自我维持,使得不清楚主体如何建立真正的社会互动并获得与个体构成无关的习惯。因此,为了应对这些挑战,我提出了一种替代性的规范性概念,该概念基于维特根斯坦的、面向行动的和实用主义的意义概念,区分了具有规范性观点的主体和外部规范性标准。我主张,规范性现象是一种由主体的观点所建立的互动,这种观点是由自主能动性所定义的,并且是自我维持系统的一部分。后者确立了评估互动的外部规范性标准,而这些标准可能与互动主体的身份相符,也可能不相符。将外部规范性标准与互动主体的自我构成分开,不仅解决了挑战,而且还有可能解释了主体的情境性和关系性特征。