Ligthart Sjors, Douglas Thomas, Bublitz Christoph, Kooijmans Tijs, Meynen Gerben
Department of Criminal Law, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037AB Tilburg, Netherlands.
Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Neuroethics. 2021 Jul;14:191-203. doi: 10.1007/s12152-020-09438-4. Epub 2020 Jun 20.
A central question in the current neurolegal and neuroethical literature is how brain-reading technologies could contribute to criminal justice. Some of these technologies have already been deployed within different criminal justice systems in Europe, including Slovenia, Italy, England and Wales, and the Netherlands, typically to determine guilt, legal responsibility, or recidivism risk. In this regard, the question arises whether brain-reading could permissibly be used against the person's will. To provide adequate legal protection from such non-consensual brain-reading in the European legal context, ethicists have called for the recognition of a novel fundamental legal right to mental privacy. In this paper, we explore whether these ethical calls for recognising a novel legal right to mental privacy are necessary in the European context. We argue that a right to mental privacy could be derived from, or at least developed within in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and that introducing an additional fundamental right to protect against (forensic) brain-reading is not necessary. What is required, however, is a specification of the implications of existing rights for particular neurotechnologies and purposes.
当前神经法学和神经伦理学文献中的一个核心问题是，大脑读取技术如何能对刑事司法有所助益。其中一些技术已在欧洲不同的刑事司法系统中得到应用，包括斯洛文尼亚、意大利、英格兰和威尔士以及荷兰，通常用于判定有罪、法律责任或再犯风险。在这方面，问题在于大脑读取技术是否可以违背个人意愿而被使用。为在欧洲法律背景下提供充分的法律保护，使其免受这种未经同意的大脑读取技术的侵害，伦理学家呼吁承认一项新的精神隐私基本法律权利。在本文中，我们探讨在欧洲背景下，这些要求承认新的精神隐私法律权利的伦理呼吁是否必要。我们认为，精神隐私权利可以从欧洲人权法院的判例法中推导出来，或者至少可以在其中得到发展，而且引入一项额外的基本权利来防范（法医）大脑读取技术并无必要。然而，需要明确现有权利对于特定神经技术和目的的影响。
