School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai, China.
BMC Psychol. 2022 Apr 9;10(1):95. doi: 10.1186/s40359-022-00802-y.
Overtime is an international phenomenon, especially in some Chinese Internet technology companies, the 996 work regime is a common corporate atmosphere. This paper holds that overtime work is the result of a long-term dynamic game between employees and employers. In such a dynamic evolution process, employers and employees both cooperate and conflict, they will choose a strategy conducive to their own development through long-term learning and improvement.
Based on the evolutionary game theory and principal-agent theory, this paper constructs a [Formula: see text] evolutionary game matrix. The strategies of employees can be divided into voluntary overtime and involuntary overtime, while the strategies of employers can be divided into providing overtime pay and not providing overtime pay. The stability of the system is related to four parameters: resource consumption, information asymmetry coefficient, trust coefficient, and moral hazard coefficient.
Through an in-depth study of the model and data simulation, the system has five equilibrium points, an ESS point, and a saddle point in any case. Accordingly, we put forward two theorems and three propositions, which are verified not only theoretically but also by data simulation. Besides, the strategies of the employees and the employers will evolve from the initial state to (Involuntarily, Not pay) or (Voluntarily, Pay) under different situations. This is closely related to the initial parameters of the evolutionary game model and the payment matrix.
By summarizing the influence of each parameter on the evolutionary path, we believe that fairness and information equivalence between employees and employers can effectively promote both parties to reach the Pareto optimal state. In other words, employees and employers need to communicate and share information promptly to ensure the unity of information acquired by each other and achieve a win-win situation. This paper contributes to providing theoretical guidance and practical enlightenment for organizations to manage employees' overtime behavior scientifically and improve their work psychology reasonably.
加班是一个国际现象，尤其是在中国的一些互联网技术公司，996 工作制度是一种常见的企业文化。本文认为，加班是员工和雇主之间长期动态博弈的结果。在这样一个动态演化过程中，雇主和员工既合作又冲突，他们会通过长期的学习和改进选择有利于自身发展的策略。
基于演化博弈理论和委托代理理论，构建了一个[公式：见正文]演化博弈矩阵。员工的策略可以分为自愿加班和非自愿加班，而雇主的策略可以分为提供加班费和不提供加班费。系统的稳定性与四个参数有关：资源消耗、信息不对称系数、信任系数和道德风险系数。
通过对模型的深入研究和数据模拟，该系统有五个平衡点、一个 ESS 点和一个鞍点。据此，提出了两个定理和三个命题，不仅从理论上进行了验证，还通过数据模拟进行了验证。此外，在不同情况下，员工和雇主的策略将从初始状态演变为（非自愿、不支付）或（自愿、支付）。这与演化博弈模型和支付矩阵的初始参数密切相关。
通过总结各参数对演化路径的影响，我们认为员工和雇主之间的公平和信息对等可以有效地促进双方达成帕累托最优状态。换句话说，员工和雇主需要及时进行沟通和信息共享，以确保彼此获得的信息一致，并实现双赢局面。本文为组织科学管理员工加班行为和合理改善员工工作心理提供了理论指导和实践启示。
