Key Laboratory of Transport Industry of Big Data Application Technologies for Comprehensive Transport, Ministry of Transport, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 100044, China.
School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Shang Yuan Cun 3#, Haidian District, Beijing, 100044, China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2022 Sep;29(42):63321-63343. doi: 10.1007/s11356-021-18275-8. Epub 2022 Apr 22.
Despite their important role in the fight against global climate change, the coordination of green pharmaceutical supply chains (GPSC) has rarely been studied. To fill this research gap and realize the optimal green performance of GPSC, this study aimed to investigate the coordination of a GPSC considering green investment, green logistics, and government intervention. Using a game-theoretic approach, we establish decision models and analyze the equilibrium strategies in several GPSC scenarios. A linked two-part tariff (LTPT) contract is proposed for the coordination of the GPSC. In addition, we explore the many important implications of changes in the parameters. This research shows that, under different conditions, governments should reasonably implement different interventions in order to promote the positive global performance of GPSC. Government intervention can increase the benchmark height and make more room for green improvement. The proposed LTPT contract can assist in the realization of GPSC coordination, obtain a greater consumer surplus, and achieve optimal green performance. Higher flexibility-influence coefficients of green degree on costs are conducive to the emission reductions and sustainable development of GPSC. Moreover, cultivating green preference in the market can save the government expenditures on subsidies. When the green investment coefficient of a GPSC is larger, the GPSC members lack motivation for green improvement, and the government needs to provide more subsidies rather than taxes in order to improve the green degree of the GPSC. Increased rewards from the government to the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the TPLSP will reduce the subsidies for the pharmaceutical retailer. Government intervention influences the scope of an LTPT contract. The findings provide rich managerial insights and implications for the GPSC policymakers and decision-makers in achieving sustainability goals.
尽管绿色制药供应链（GPSC）在应对全球气候变化方面发挥着重要作用，但对其协调的研究却很少。为了填补这一研究空白，实现 GPSC 的最佳绿色绩效，本研究旨在探讨考虑绿色投资、绿色物流和政府干预的 GPSC 协调问题。我们运用博弈论方法，建立决策模型，并分析了几种 GPSC 情景下的均衡策略。提出了一种链接两部分关税（LTPT）合同来协调 GPSC。此外，我们还探讨了参数变化的许多重要含义。研究表明，在不同条件下，政府应合理实施不同的干预措施，以促进 GPSC 的积极全球绩效。政府干预可以提高基准高度，为绿色改进留出更多空间。所提出的 LTPT 合同有助于实现 GPSC 协调，获得更大的消费者剩余，并实现最佳的绿色绩效。绿色程度对成本的灵活性影响系数有利于 GPSC 的减排和可持续发展。此外，在市场中培养绿色偏好可以节省政府的补贴支出。当 GPSC 的绿色投资系数较大时，GPSC 成员缺乏绿色改进的动力，政府需要提供更多的补贴而不是税收，以提高 GPSC 的绿色程度。政府对制药商和 TPLSP 的奖励增加将减少对制药零售商的补贴。政府干预影响 LTPT 合同的范围。研究结果为 GPSC 政策制定者和决策者实现可持续发展目标提供了丰富的管理见解和启示。
