Quillien Tadeg
Center for Evolutionary Psychology, Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660, USA.
J Theor Biol. 2020 May 7;492:110204. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110204. Epub 2020 Feb 19.
We show that altruism can evolve as a signaling device designed to solve commitment problems in interactions with outside options. In a simple evolutionary game-theoretic model, uncertainty about agents' incentives to stay in a relationship can cause the relationship to collapse, because of a vicious circle where being skeptical about one's partner's commitment makes one even more likely to leave the relationship. When agents have the possibility to send costly gifts to each other, analytical modeling and agent-based simulations show that gift-giving can evolve as a credible signal of commitment, which decreases the likelihood of relationship dissolution. Interestingly, different conventions can determine the meaning of the signal conveyed by the gift. Exactly two kinds of conventions are evolutionarily stable: according to the first convention, an agent who sends a gift signals that he intends to stay in the relationship if and only if he also receives a gift; according to the second convention, a gift signals unconditional commitment.
我们表明，利他主义可以作为一种信号装置而演变，旨在解决与外部选择互动中的承诺问题。在一个简单的演化博弈论模型中，关于参与者维持关系的动机的不确定性可能导致关系破裂，这是因为存在一个恶性循环，即对伴侣的承诺持怀疑态度会使自己更有可能离开这段关系。当参与者有可能相互赠送昂贵礼物时，分析建模和基于主体的模拟表明，送礼可以演变为一种可信的承诺信号，这会降低关系解体的可能性。有趣的是，不同的习俗可以决定礼物所传达信号的含义。恰好有两种习俗在演化上是稳定的：根据第一种习俗，送礼的参与者表明，当且仅当他也收到礼物时，他才打算维持这段关系；根据第二种习俗，礼物表示无条件的承诺。
