Cao Fuguo, Wang Cong
School of Law, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China.
School of Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China.
Front Psychol. 2022 May 4;13:832617. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.832617. eCollection 2022.
The selection of the procurement model, which is a process of discretion exercised by procurement officials, is crucial to the Public-private Partnership (PPP) procurement performance. From theoretical analysis and international practice, we could find that the negotiation method is more suitable for complex PPP projects, while the tendering method is widely used in China's PPP procurement. To analyze the reasons for the phenomenon, we used the logit regression model to examine the influence of regulatory competition, risk aversion preference, and tacit interaction on the procurement model selection based on the data of 8,926 PPP projects from 2009 to 2021 in China. The results indicate that regulatory competition leads to confusion in procurement model selection, while risk aversion preference and tacit interaction significantly promote the application of tendering. Moreover, the heterogeneity analysis of regions and return models prove that provincial capitals and municipalities are more susceptible to regulatory competition, risk aversion preference, and tacit interaction than ordinary cities. Compared with user-pay projects, government-pay projects and viability gap funding projects are more susceptible to regulatory competition and risk aversion preference, and less affected by tacit interaction. Therefore, to optimize the procurement model selection, policymakers should improve procurement policies to reduce the adverse effects of regulatory competition, risk aversion preference, and tacit interactions.
采购模式的选择是采购官员行使自由裁量权的过程，对公私合营（PPP）采购绩效至关重要。从理论分析和国际实践来看，我们可以发现谈判方式更适用于复杂的PPP项目，而招标方式在中国的PPP采购中被广泛使用。为分析这一现象的原因，我们基于2009年至2021年中国8926个PPP项目的数据，运用逻辑回归模型考察了监管竞争、风险规避偏好和默契互动对采购模式选择的影响。结果表明，监管竞争导致采购模式选择混乱，而风险规避偏好和默契互动显著促进了招标方式的应用。此外，地区和回报模型的异质性分析证明，省会城市和直辖市比普通城市更容易受到监管竞争、风险规避偏好和默契互动的影响。与使用者付费项目相比，政府付费项目和可行性缺口补助项目更容易受到监管竞争和风险规避偏好的影响，受默契互动的影响较小。因此，为优化采购模式选择，政策制定者应完善采购政策，以减少监管竞争、风险规避偏好和默契互动的不利影响。
