Cheng Xiaotong, Cheng Min
Department of Management Science and Engineering, School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai, China.
Front Psychol. 2023 Jan 11;13:1023945. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1023945. eCollection 2022.
Effective supervision is one of the important ways to ensure the smooth implementation of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. To understand the characteristics of the decision-making behavior of the public and private sectors in the supervision of PPP projects and the influencing mechanisms of some factors, we combine prospect theory and mental accounting theory into the evolutionary game analysis. First, we use prospect theory to reflect the behavioral characteristics of game players when making decisions and classify the value function into a valence account and a cost account according to the mental accounting theory. Accordingly, we construct a payoff matrix based on prospect theory and mental accounting theory, and the system's equilibrium state is analyzed. Then, based on numerical simulations, the influence of different parameters on the behavior of the public and private sectors is analyzed, and management suggestions for practical reference are put forward based on the simulation results. The results show that the greater the perceived cost of active behavior for the public and private sectors, the less likely they will take active behavior. Secondly, there is insufficient incentive for the private sector to fulfill contracts when the penalties for its opportunistic behavior are minor. Thirdly, increasing the cost reference points and decreasing the valence reference points will promote the public and private sectors to adopt active behavior. Fourth, the public sector and the private sector are more inclined to take active behavior when they need to bear more significant risk losses. This study provides new ideas for the analysis of the game players' decision-making behaviors in the supervision of PPP projects and delivers a decision-making reference for reasonable supervision.
有效监管是确保公私合营（PPP）项目顺利实施的重要途径之一。为了解公私部门在PPP项目监管中的决策行为特征以及一些因素的影响机制，我们将前景理论和心理账户理论纳入演化博弈分析。首先，我们运用前景理论来反映博弈参与者在决策时的行为特征，并根据心理账户理论将价值函数分为收益账户和成本账户。据此，我们构建了基于前景理论和心理账户理论的收益矩阵，并分析了系统的均衡状态。然后，基于数值模拟，分析了不同参数对公私部门行为的影响，并根据模拟结果提出了可供实际参考的管理建议。结果表明，公私部门主动行为的感知成本越高，其采取主动行为的可能性就越小。其次，当私营部门机会主义行为的惩罚较轻时，其履行合同的激励不足。第三，提高成本参考点和降低收益参考点将促使公私部门采取主动行为。第四，当公私部门需要承担更重大的风险损失时，它们更倾向于采取主动行为。本研究为分析PPP项目监管中博弈参与者的决策行为提供了新思路，并为合理监管提供了决策参考。
