弱整合信息理论的强度。

The strength of weak integrated information theory.

机构信息

Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK; Department of Psychology, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK.

Centre for Psychedelic Research, Imperial College London, London, UK; Data Science Institute, Imperial College London, London, UK; Centre for Complexity Science, Imperial College London, London, UK.

出版信息

Trends Cogn Sci. 2022 Aug;26(8):646-655. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2022.04.008. Epub 2022 Jun 1.

DOI:10.1016/j.tics.2022.04.008

PMID:35659757

Abstract

The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) is divisive: while some believe it provides an unprecedentedly powerful approach to address the 'hard problem', others dismiss it on grounds that it is untestable. We argue that the appeal and applicability of IIT can be greatly widened if we distinguish two flavours of the theory: strong IIT, which identifies consciousness with specific properties associated with maxima of integrated information; and weak IIT, which tests pragmatic hypotheses relating aspects of consciousness to broader measures of information dynamics. We review challenges for strong IIT, explain how existing empirical findings are well explained by weak IIT without needing to commit to the entirety of strong IIT, and discuss the outlook for both flavours of IIT.

摘要

意识的综合信息理论（IIT）具有分歧性：一些人认为它为解决“难题”提供了一种前所未有的强大方法，而另一些人则认为它是不可检验的，因此对其不屑一顾。我们认为，如果我们区分两种理论：强 IIT 将意识与与极大值的综合信息相关联的特定属性识别为意识；而弱 IIT 则检验与更广泛的信息动力学测量相关的意识方面的实用假设，那么 IIT 的吸引力和适用性可以大大扩展。我们回顾了强 IIT 面临的挑战，解释了弱 IIT 如何在不需要完全接受强 IIT 的情况下很好地解释现有的经验发现，并讨论了这两种 IIT 的前景。