School of Business Administration, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai 201600, China.
The Research & Development Department, Heilongjiang Ecology Meteorological Centre, Harbin150030, China.
Comput Intell Neurosci. 2022 Jun 28;2022:7149531. doi: 10.1155/2022/7149531. eCollection 2022.
This study explores the information sharing (IS) in a supply chain (SC) with a vendor selling goods via an e-retailer to consumers. Four scenarios were considered for the multistage game between the vendor and the e-retailer, and the vendor's policy of IS and the e-retailer's decision on online platform access were discussed under each scenario. The results show that the e-retailer will access the online platform at a low fixed access fee and will not at a high fixed access fee. Whether the vendor shares information with the e-retailer or not, he/she always faces a worse situation with e-retailer's online access. The vendor's decision on IS hinges on the commission rate, contesting intensity, and fixed access fee. When the commission rate is low, the vendor will share the demand if the fixed access fee is low and will not share the information if the access fee is moderate. When the commission rate is high and the contesting is fierce, the vendor is willing to share the demand if the fixed access fee is low or moderate and has no difference in the decision on IS if the fixed access fee is high.
本研究探讨了供应链中的信息共享(IS),其中供应商通过电子零售商向消费者销售商品。针对供应商和电子零售商之间的多阶段博弈,考虑了四种情景,并在每种情景下讨论了供应商的 IS 策略和电子零售商对在线平台接入的决策。结果表明,电子零售商将以较低的固定接入费接入在线平台,而不会以较高的固定接入费接入。无论供应商是否与电子零售商共享信息,他/她总是面临着电子零售商在线接入的更糟糕情况。供应商的 IS 决策取决于佣金率、竞争强度和固定接入费。当佣金率较低时,如果固定接入费较低,供应商将共享需求,如果接入费适中,则不会共享信息。当佣金率较高且竞争激烈时,如果固定接入费较低或适中,供应商愿意共享需求,如果固定接入费较高,则在 IS 决策方面没有区别。