School of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing, PR China.
School of Chemistry and Chemistry Engineering, Yangtze Normal University, Chongqing, PR China.
PLoS One. 2020 Jul 29;15(7):e0236099. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0236099. eCollection 2020.
This paper aims at designing coordination contract in a dual channel supply chain (DCSC) which consists of a socially responsible manufacturer and a retailer. We build stylized game models under both centralized and decentralized scenarios. Then, we identify the reason for supply chain inefficiency under decentralized scenario. Further, according to the manufacturer's corporate social responsibility (CSR) coefficient, we design two different contracts to achieve coordination. We find that with the impact of CSR, social welfare under centralized scenario is always higher than that under decentralized scenario. However, profit of the whole supply chain between the two scenarios has different relationship. More specifically, when CSR coefficient is relatively low, profit under centralized scenario is higher than that under decentralized scenario. When CSR coefficient is high, profit under centralized scenario is lower than that under decentralized scenario. Due to these two cases, we respectively design revenue sharing contract with franchise fee and wholesale price contract with franchise fee and government subsidy to achieve coordination. The result suggests that encouraging the manufacturer to bear CSR properly can reach a multi-win for social welfare, consumers and supply chain members through coordination contract. However, when CSR coefficient is higher than a certain threshold, conflict between supply chain members becomes irreconcilable which results in the retailer's resistance. In this condition, only through subsidy from government or philanthropic organization can supply chain members sustain their cooperation.
本文旨在设计由社会责任制造商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链（DCSC）中的协调合同。我们在集中式和分散式场景下分别建立了简化的博弈模型。然后，我们确定了分散式场景下供应链效率低下的原因。进一步地，根据制造商的企业社会责任（CSR）系数，我们设计了两种不同的合同来实现协调。我们发现，在 CSR 的影响下，集中式场景下的社会福利总是高于分散式场景下的社会福利。然而，两种场景下整个供应链的利润却有着不同的关系。更具体地说，当 CSR 系数较低时，集中式场景下的利润高于分散式场景下的利润。当 CSR 系数较高时，集中式场景下的利润低于分散式场景下的利润。由于这两种情况，我们分别设计了带有特许经营费的收益分享合同和带有特许经营费和政府补贴的批发价格合同，以实现协调。结果表明，通过协调合同，适当鼓励制造商承担企业社会责任，可以实现社会福利、消费者和供应链成员的多赢。然而，当 CSR 系数高于某个阈值时，供应链成员之间的冲突变得不可调和，导致零售商的抵制。在这种情况下，只有通过政府或慈善组织的补贴，供应链成员才能维持合作。
