Rehren Paul, Sinnott-Armstrong Walter
Ethics Institute, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC United States of America.
Rev Philos Psychol. 2022 Jul 29:1-27. doi: 10.1007/s13164-022-00649-7.
Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three times, 6-8 days apart. In addition to investigating the stability of our participants' ratings over time, we also explored some potential explanations for instability. To end, we will discuss these and other potential psychological sources of moral stability (or instability) and highlight possible philosophical implications of our findings.
心理学家和哲学家常常携手合作,共同探究道德认知的诸多方面。在本文中,我们想要强调一个迄今为止相对被忽视的方面:道德判断随时间的稳定性。在解释为何哲学家和心理学家应考虑稳定性并审视以往研究之后,我们将呈现一项原创的三波纵向研究的结果。我们要求参与者在一系列牺牲困境中,对相同的行为进行三次判断,每次间隔6 - 8天。除了调查我们参与者的评分随时间的稳定性之外,我们还探究了不稳定性的一些潜在解释。最后,我们将讨论这些以及道德稳定性(或不稳定性)的其他潜在心理根源,并强调我们研究结果可能的哲学意义。