Nook Erik C, Satpute Ajay B, Ochsner Kevin N
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland St, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA.
Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, USA.
Affect Sci. 2021 Apr 20;2(2):187-198. doi: 10.1007/s42761-021-00036-y. eCollection 2021 Jun.
Friends and therapists often encourage people in distress to say how they feel (i.e., name their emotions) with the hope that identifying their emotions will help them cope. Although lay and some psychological theories posit that emotion naming should facilitate subsequent emotion regulation, there is little research directly testing this question. Here, we report on two experimental studies that test how naming the emotions evoked by aversive images impacts subsequent regulation of those emotions. In study 1 ( = 80), participants were randomly assigned into one of four between-subjects conditions in which they either (i) passively observed aversive images, (ii) named the emotions that these images made them feel, (iii) regulated their emotions by reappraising the meaning of images, or (iv) both named and regulated their emotions. Analyses of self-reported negative affect revealed that emotion naming impeded emotion regulation via reappraisal. Participants who named their emotions before reappraising reported feeling than those who regulated without naming. Study 2 ( = 60) replicated these findings in a within-participants design, demonstrated that emotion naming also impeded regulation via mindful acceptance, and showed that observed effects were unrelated to a measure of social desirability, thereby mitigating the concern of experimenter demand. Together, these studies show that the impact of emotion naming on emotion regulation opposes common intuitions: instead of facilitating emotion regulation via reappraisal or acceptance, constructing an instance of a specific emotion category by giving it a name may "crystalize" one's affective experience and make it more resistant to modification.
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s42761-021-00036-y.
朋友和治疗师常常鼓励处于痛苦中的人说出自己的感受(即说出他们的情绪),希望识别自己的情绪能帮助他们应对。尽管外行和一些心理学理论假定说出情绪有助于随后的情绪调节,但几乎没有研究直接检验这个问题。在此,我们报告两项实验研究,测试说出厌恶图像引发的情绪如何影响随后对这些情绪的调节。在研究1(n = 80)中,参与者被随机分配到四个组间条件之一,在这些条件下,他们要么(i)被动观察厌恶图像,(ii)说出这些图像让他们产生的情绪,(iii)通过重新评估图像的意义来调节情绪,要么(iv)既说出情绪又调节情绪。对自我报告的负面情绪的分析表明,说出情绪会阻碍通过重新评估进行的情绪调节。在重新评估之前说出自己情绪的参与者报告的感受比那些未说出情绪而进行调节的参与者更强烈。研究2(n = 60)在参与者内设计中重复了这些发现,表明说出情绪也会阻碍通过正念接纳进行的调节,并表明观察到的效应与社会期望的测量无关,从而减轻了对实验者需求的担忧。总之,这些研究表明说出情绪对情绪调节的影响与常见直觉相反:通过给特定情绪类别命名来构建一个实例,不是通过重新评估或接纳来促进情绪调节,反而可能会“固化”一个人的情感体验,使其更难改变。
在线版本包含可在10.1007/s42761-021-00036-y获取的补充材料。