Wang Dong, Wu Meiling, Qu Jiulong, Fan Yuncui
School of Business and Management, Jilin University, Changchun, China.
School of Economics and Management, Jilin Jianzhu University, Changchun, China.
Front Psychol. 2022 Aug 22;13:943958. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.943958. eCollection 2022.
In China, grassroots governments have attempted to introduce community planners into community micro-renewal, using their expertise to guide the design and implementation of community micro-renewal. However, issues remain to be studied and resolved, including how to effectively play the community planner role to coordinate multiple parties' interests. This study constructed an evolutionary game model based on the behaviors of multiple subjects with participation by community planners, to establish the payment functions on both sides of the game under different choice strategies; explore evolutionary stabilization strategies by replication dynamic equations; and to analyze the conditions for the multi-party evolutionary game to reach the ideal stable state. The findings: (1) Show that financial subsidies provided by the grassroots government to community planners have a positive effect on the latter's behavioral choices; (2) Illustrate the path of the tripartite evolutionary game among the grassroots government, residents, and community planners to reach ideal stability (incentive, active participation, and positive promotion); and (3) Describe how the project benefits from community planners promoting community micro-renewal can effectively promote their positive behavioral choices.
在中国，基层政府已尝试将社区规划师引入社区微更新，利用他们的专业知识指导社区微更新的设计与实施。然而，仍有一些问题有待研究和解决，包括如何有效发挥社区规划师的作用以协调多方利益。本研究构建了一个基于多主体行为且有社区规划师参与的演化博弈模型，以确定不同选择策略下博弈双方的支付函数；通过复制动态方程探索演化稳定策略；并分析多方演化博弈达到理想稳定状态的条件。研究结果：（1）表明基层政府向社区规划师提供的财政补贴对后者的行为选择有积极影响；（2）阐明基层政府、居民和社区规划师三方演化博弈达到理想稳定状态（激励、积极参与和正向推动）的路径；（3）描述社区规划师推动社区微更新所带来的项目收益如何能有效促进他们的积极行为选择。
