Faculty of Civil Engineering and Mechanics, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, 212013, China.
State Key Laboratory of Pollution Control and Resource Reuse, School of the Environment, Nanjing University, Nanjing, 210023, People's Republic of China.
Environ Sci Pollut Res Int. 2024 Feb;31(6):9011-9030. doi: 10.1007/s11356-023-31591-5. Epub 2024 Jan 6.
Although the government highly focuses on old residential building energy-saving renovation (ORBESR), many hinders still exist and the efficiency of it is still low. This paper proposes a four-party evolutionary game model to study the impact of relative stakeholders' choices, involving developers, residents, neighborhood councils, and governments. Using this model, this paper studies what influences the conflicts between developers and residents take on the efficiency of ORBESR. In addition, what influence the residents, neighborhood councils, and developers' strategies will take on the ORBESR under the condition of evolutionary stability strategy. This paper finally concludes that governments could propose high penalties first to accelerate the stability of the system, then suitable subsidies to relieve the financial burden and to achieve high efficiency. The governments could provide a suitable plan for residents' investment to promote residents' participation. The neighborhood councils arouse the ways and facilities to help residents understand and participate in the ORBESR and try to solve the conflicts between developers and residents can improve the residents' participation and the developers' willingness to implement the ORBESR.
尽管政府高度重视老旧住宅建筑节能改造（ORBESR），但仍存在许多障碍，其效率仍然较低。本文提出了一个四方进化博弈模型，以研究相关利益相关者的选择对开发商、居民、邻里委员会和政府的影响，研究开发商与居民之间的冲突如何影响 ORBESR 的效率。此外，还研究了在进化稳定策略的条件下，居民、邻里委员会和开发商的策略将如何影响 ORBESR。本文最后得出结论，政府可以先提出高额罚款，以加速系统的稳定，然后提供适当的补贴，以减轻财政负担，实现高效率。政府可以为居民的投资提供一个合适的方案，以促进居民的参与。邻里委员会可以唤起居民了解和参与 ORBESR 的方式和设施，并试图解决开发商和居民之间的冲突，这可以提高居民的参与度和开发商实施 ORBESR 的意愿。
